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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT, ] 
Plaintiff and ] 
Appellant, ] 
v. 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT, ] 
Defendant and ] 
Respondent. ] 
) Case No, 860229-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Plaint iff/Appellant herein elects to file the within 
reply brief, 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Defendant has misstated the issues presented for 
review. Nine separate and distinct issued have been raised by-
Plaintiff for review by the Court of Appeals. Defendant has 
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improperly attempted to consolidate Plaintiff's issues into four 
points. In so doing the Defendant has raised three new issues 
involving abuse of judicial discretion, and Defendant has failed 
to address the following five (5) issues in their entirety as 
stated in Defendant's "Issues Presented for Review". (Defendant's 
Brief at p. 1) 
1. The trial court erred in failing to make adequate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
2. The trial court failed to allow Plaintiff the 
right to present some of his case on the issue of child custody-
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
3. The trial court erred in failing to consider the 
best interests of the children with respect to Defendant's plans 
to move the children out of state. 
4. The trial court was biased and predisposed to 
award custody to the Defendant. 
5. The trial court erred in its determination of 
visitation rights. 
The issues which were presented by Defendant touched on 
the four remaining issues brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
brief clearly and distinctly identifies eight issues revolving 
around error as a matter of law. 
Defendant properly presented for review only one of 
nine issues brought before the Court of Appeals by Plaintiff. 
That was, "is the Plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees in 
bringing this appeal?" (Defendant's Brief at p. 1) 
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POINTE I 
THE FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE 
The Defendant cites Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 
254 (Utah 1985) in favor of the proposition that the findings 
were adequate. 
In this case we must distinguish between a trial at 
which child custody was at issue and a hearing in a petition to 
modify. The Utah Supreme Court pointed out the distinction in 
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983), where the 
Court cited Chandler v. West, Utah 610 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1980), as 
follows: 
Find ings of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law 
may not be necessa ry in the d e n i a l of every 
a c t i o n to modify a d ivorce d e c r e e , except to 
s t a t e t h a t the change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s does 
not warrant m o d i f i c a t i o n . 
W h e r e , a s h e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n i s g r a n t e d , the d i s t r i c t cour t 
should make f i n d i n g s to i n d i c a t e the r easons 
why mod i f i c a t i on was found to be a p p r o p r i a t e . 
The making of fo rma l f i n d i n g s of f a c t and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw, w h e t h e r t h e motion i s 
g r a n t e d or d e n i e d , m a t e r i a l l y a s s i s t s t h e 
p a r t i e s in de te rmin ing whether t h e r e may be a 
b a s i s for a p p e a l , and i f an appeal i s t a k e n , 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s i s t s t h i s c o u r t in i t s 
rev iew. 
The Penning ton , s u p r a , case was a d e n i a l of a p e t i t i o n 
f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s , the Utah Supreme Court sa id a t 
page 3 : 
We acknowledge t h a t the f i n d i n g s a re meager, 
and s t r o n g l y a d v i s e r e s p o n d e n t ' s a t t o r n e y , 
who d r a f t e d t h e m , t o t a k e t h e n e c e s s a r y 
e f f o r t in the f u t u r e to p repa re more s p e c i f i c 
and s u b s t a n t i v e f i n d i n g s . We c a n n o t 
overemphasize the importance of wel l w r i t t e n 
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f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t m o d i f i c a t i o n s of d i v o r c e 
d e c r e e s . See T u c k e y v s . Tuckey , U t a h , 649 
P .2d 88 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . "One of t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h i s 
r e q u i r e m e n t i s t o e x p l a i n t h e b a s i s f o r t h e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n so t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y c a n 
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t o c h a l l e n g e i t and so t h e 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n p r o p e r l y r e v i e w i t on 
a p p e a l . " S h i o j i v . S h i o j i , U t a h , 671 P .2d 
1 3 5 , 136 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . C o n c l u s o r y f i n d i n g s g i v e 
l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
r e a s o n s f o r r e a c h i n g i t s r e s u l t . S u c h 
f i n d i n g s may i n v i t e u n n e c e s s a r y e x p e n s i v e 
a p p e a l s which i n t u r n d e l a y f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n 
of t h e i s s u e s and impede j u d i c i a l economy. 
POINTE I I 
CUSTODY MUST BE DECIDED IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN 
Defendant's brief raises the issue that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody. It appears 
that Defendant has ignored Utah statues and case law which 
require that the custody award must be decided in the best 
interests of the children. Failure to do so would violate the 
natural and protected rights of the parents and the children. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645-668 (1972) concludes that: 
..as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was 
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before 
his children were taken from him and that, by denying 
him a hearing and extending it to all other parents 
whose custody of their children is challenged the state 
denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. 
THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WAS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
Defendant claims that the issue of custody was not properly 
before the Court. (Defendant's Brief at p. 7-12) The Defendant's 
brief fails to acknowledge Plaintiff's answer to Counterclaim 
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wherein he properly placed custody in issue before the Court (R. 
at p. 25). Defendant's brief holds that Plaintiff is bound by 
the admissions of his pleadings. (Defendant's Brief at p. 11) 
Plaintiff maintains that custody was raised as an issue by the 
pleadings, but even if it were not, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54(c)(1) provides that: 
Every final judgment shall grant relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. 
See also Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 4i4 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff declined the Court's 
invitation to stop the trial and evaluate the custody issue. 
(Defendant's Brief at p. 12) Defendant's brief at p. 10 admits 
that custody was an issue and asserts that: 
...plaintiff, on advice of counsel, withdrew the 
custody issue. 
Defendant has raised the above cited claims out of 
context with respect to the court proceedings wherein judicial 
bias became an issue. 
Plaintiff never withdrew custody as an issue. In fact, 
Plaintiff's counsel did move to amend the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(b). (R. at 619, line 25 and R. at 
622, line 7) 
Upon conclusion of the trial Plaintiff moved for a new 
trial, and a hearing upon said motion was held July 1, 1986. 
Custody was clearly in issue: 
Mr. Cowley: I don't think we need to say any more about 
that subject of child custody. That's been 
discussed adnauseam. It was at his request 
we got into this very specific custody thing 
which we always thought was unnecessary, but 
he wanted it and sobeit. 
(R. at p.359, lines 21-25) 
Appended hereto is a chart identifying fourteen (14) of 
the instances at trial where testimony was heard relating to 
grounds precedent for the award of custody. Each such instance 
is charted to show the case law citations and basis upon which 
custody has been awarded. See Addendum, Exhibit "A". 
Rule 15(b) provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. 
B. 
THE CUSTODY ISSUE WAS NOT 
RESOLVED BY THE PLEADINGS 
Defendant's brief raises the issue that the Custody 
issue was resolved by the pleadings because Plaintiff entered 
into a Stipulation awarding custody. (Defendant's Brief at p. 10) 
Even if the parties had purported to stipulation on the 
child custody issue, such a stipulation would not be binding upon 
the Court, and the Court, upon the rejection of such a stipula-
tion would have the right and obligation to allow each party to 
fully present their case on this issue. 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) provides: 
Though a stipulation pertaining to matters of 
divorce, custody and property rights therein is 
advisory on court and will usually be followed, such a 
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stipulation is not necessarily binding on court; it is 
only a recommendation ... 
Plaintiff affirms that a proposed stipulation was 
presented to the Court but was never signed. After the parties 
were unable to agree on the terms of said stipulation the Court 
properly set aside said proposed stipulation in its entirety and 
ordered that a trial be held, (R. at 205) 
Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944 ( Utah 1953) holds 
that: 
. . • the law was intended to give the courts power 
Igreement of the to disregard the stipulations or a j 
parties in the first instance and eiiter judgment for 
such alimony or child support as appears reasonable and 
to thereafter modify such judgment^ when change of 
circumstances justifies it, regardless of attempts of 
the parties to control the matter by contract. 
If the reviewing Court finds that an answer in a 
divorce proceeding is an admission of factp asserted therein, as 
asserted in Defendant's brief at p. 11, th^ Court must also find 
that Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Counterclaim properly 
raises the issue of custody before the Courlt. 
C. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF HIS RIGHT TO AMftND HIS 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 15(b) 
In response to Plaintiff's poifct that "a new trial 
should be granted pursuant to U.R.CP, 15(b) on the issue of 
child custody because the court tried the issue, but failed to 
allow the Appellant his right to present hfLs case on that issue, 
and failed to allow him to amend his pleadings", Defendant has 
submitted only that Plaintiff was aware cjf her planned move to 
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Colorado before trial, and that therefore, Plaintiff should not 
be allowed to amend the pleadings. (Defendant's Brief at pages 
12-13) 
Defendant has incorrectly cited Plaintifffs brief at 
page 13 which discusses Defendant's threats to leave the state 
and take the children, not knowledge of the planned move: 
Q: And what did she tell you? 
A: That if I did not give her everything she 
wanted, she would use her parents1 money to 
take the children so far away I would never 
see them. 
(R. at 578, lines 18-21). 
Q: And what were you discussing at that time? 
A: The same thing. 
Q: And what was said to you at that time? 
A: If I did not give her everything she wanted, 
she would be using her parents' money to make 
sure that I never saw the children again. 
And I believe at that point she had mentioned 
Europe. 
Q: Any other conversations of that substance? 
A: Not off the top of my head, no. Those stuck 
pretty well. 
(R. at 579, lines 9-18), 
Case law demonstrates that Rule 15(b) motions should be 
granted even after the close of evidence and even after a verdict 
is rendered. See Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 
668 F.2d 1193 (CA 8th 1982), Brown v. Ward, 438 F.2d 1285 (A 4th, 
1970), and General Insurance Company v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
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D. 
THE RECORD REFLECTS JUDICIAL 
BIAS CONCERNING CUSTODY 
Defendant's brief states that: 
"A careful review of the entire record absolutely 
refutes Mr. Eanson^ s improper allegation of bias," 
(Defendant's Brisf at p. 15). 
Plaintiff has previously submitted citations from the 
record, case law, and the supporting Affidavit of Attorney Kenn 
M• Hanson. Clearly there was question regarding the Court's 
predisposition to award custody as further reflected in the 
record of hearing upon Plaintiff's motion for a new trial: 
Mr. 
Summerhays: Mr, Ebbert has counseled at great length with Mr. 
Hanson and myself about a Series of events that 
took place at the trial regarding child custody, 
and thus events arose out cf f misunderstanding on 
Mi*
 # Ebbertfs part. He understood that was going 
to be an issue at the trial and that it had been 
handled in a stipulation which was not able to be 
refined to the point where a|ll parties could agree 
to it; and then when that ^as withdrawn, elapsed 
back to a set of pleadings that apparently in Your 
Honor's opinion did not put that issue properly 
before the court for the purposes of the trial. 
Then when Mr. Ebbert alluded during the 
course of the trial to possible bruises and 
wslts resulting from a spanking of the 
children, there was an instruction to Mr. 
Ebbert, as he understood it< 
and I don't have a transcij: 
and wanted to get one and fiaven't been able 
to yet — but to the best of Mr. Ebbert's 
recollection, your honor s^id, "I will give 
you one chance to retract that statement." 
Mr*. Ebbert interpreted that to mean that 
perhaps he had somehow offended the court and 
that he was perhaps in contempt of court. 
from the Court— 
ipt, your Honor , 
His statement to 
myself, Boy, now 
counsel was: 
If ve don^ it. 
"I said to 
I guess I 
9 
said the wrong thing and perhaps should in 
fact retract that since the Court has 
suggested that I do so. 
He did counsel with his attorney pursuant to 
Your Honor's suggestion in that regard, but 
he didn't come away with the opinion or the 
impression that he could pursue that line 
further because he felt that the Court — it 
had been explained to him that the court had 
ruled that issue was really not properly 
before the Court. 
He was confused a little further by the 
statement of the Court that he could get a 
child evaluation at that point in time and 
was leaning towards that direction, but 
didn't because he thought somehow he would be 
in contempt of court over that proceeding. 
And why we're back here today, basically, is 
to ask Your Honor to allow Mr. Ebbert to 
change his view on that point and to get a 
child custody evaluation and allow him to 
open the record just to the extent of making 
it clear that he did have his day in Court on 
the child custody issue, because he does feel 
very strongly about that. 
(R. at 349 lines 2-25 and 350 lines 1-20) 
The above quote further addresses in part Defendant's 
statement that Plaintiff is irresponsible in the submission of 
the Affidavit of Kenn Hanson. (Defendant's Brief at p. 14) The 
record further supports Mr. Hanson's Affidavit as the Court 
sought to explain its action during the hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for a New Trial. (See record at p. 364 lines 3 and 4) 
POINTE III 
VISITATION 
IN THE 
RIGHTS 
B E S T 
MUST BE 
I N T E R E S T S 
DECIDED 
OF THE 
CHILDREN 
Defendant's Brief raises the issue that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding visitation rights. 
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Defendant's brief states that Plaintiff's contentions that the 
trial court should have ordered the Defendant to remain in Utah 
are without merit. (Defendant's Brief at p. 19) Case law 
previously cited by Plaintiff in the Appellant brief is clear 
that it is an abuse of discretion to allow the custodial parent 
to remove the children out of state, limiting or preventing 
visitation by the other party. See Tanttila v. Tanttila, 382 
P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965). Precedent has further defined 
considerations which should be observed by the Court in awarding 
visitation rights in the best interests of the children. See 
Hale v. Hale, 429 NE 2d 340. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is capable of traveling 
to Colorado, and that the Defendant's right to travel should not 
be impinged. In support thereof Defendant cites Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1968). Shapiro, supra, is not 
applicable to the case at bar but rather addresses the one year 
welfare residence requirement. 
Plaintiff's Appellant brief has demonstrated the 
incapacity of Plaintiff to exercise his visitation rights because 
the children live in Colorado. (Plaintiff's Brief at p. 31-32) 
Frazier v. Frazier, 109 FLA. 164, 147 So. 464 provides that it is 
the responsibility of the custodial parent to provide the 
children the opportunity to know the non-custodial parent and to 
benefit from that parent's love and guidance through adequate 
visitation. 
UCA 30-3-5 specifies that: 
11 
Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the 
welfare of the child. 
Currey v. Currey, 321 P.2d 939 (Utah 1958) held that 
the: 
...wife who was awarded custody of the minor 
children of the parties would be required to retain 
children in the jurisdiction until further order of 
court so that husband might enjoy full privileges of 
visiting and maintaining best possible paternal 
relationship with them. 
Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1985) provides: 
Reviewing courts have universally held that the 
paramount concern in child visitation matters is the 
welfare of the child. 
While case law is abundant on the issue that visitation 
rights must be decided in the best interests of the children, 
Plaintiff will conclude this reply to Defendant's allegation that 
Plaintiff's contention is without merit by quoting from Searle v. 
Searle, 172 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1946) which said that in determining 
what is for the best welfare of a child: 
... the court must consider not only food, 
clothing, shelter, care, education, and environment, 
but must also bear in mind that every such child is 
entitled to the love, nurture, advice, and training of 
both father and mother and to deny to the child all 
opportunity to know, associate with, love, and be loved 
by either parent, may be a more serious ill than to 
refuse it in some part those things which money can 
buy • 
See also Brock v. Brock, 123 Wash. 450, 212 p. 550,551. 
POINTE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE AWARDS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
The Defendant alleges in her Brief at p.19 that the 
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Plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proving the trial 
court abused its Discretion in setting the amount of child 
support. Contrary to this assertion the Plaintiff has adequately 
set forth in his brief at pgs. 34-41, how the Court abused its 
discretion in setting the child support at a total of $650,00 per 
month along with ordering the Plaintiff to pay for health 
insurance and life insurance for the benefit of the children. 
The Defendant alleges in her bri^f at p. 19 that the 
trial court carefully considered the overall situation in setting 
the support obligations. However, the Findings of Fact read 
orally by the judge at the conclusion of the trial (Record at 
330) reveal that the judge made his award of child support solely 
upon a formula based on his calculation of the earnings of both 
parties, and that he failed to take into consideration the 
relative wealth and standard of living of the parties and the 
need of the Defendant as is mandated by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-45-7(2) which requires that the Court consider the 
following factors: 
(a) the standard of living arid situation 
of parties; 
(b) The relative wealth and i4come of the 
parties ; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
The Defendant's brief at p. 20 asserts that the 
evidence at trial showed that the Plaintiff had a net income, 
after tax earnings, of $24,000.00 per year. 
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The Plaintiff has set forth a detailed analysis in his 
brief at p. 37 of how the judge erred in finding that the 
Plaintiff had net after tax earnings of $24,000.00 per year, and 
why the preponderance of the evidence showed that the Plaintiff's 
after tax earnings were much lower. The Defendant's brief at pg. 
21 misstates the evidence and the testimony where it states that 
the Plaintiff had a gross income of $36,490.00 plus a company 
car. The Plaintiff clearly stated at trial, R. at 531, that the 
figure of $36,490.00 included an amount which the IRS required 
the Plaintiff to report as income for the value of the car but 
which he did not actually receive. 
The Plaintiff also showed at trial that he had to pay 
for his personal use of the car (R« at 531). 
The Defendant alleges on p. 20 of her brief that the 
Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's parents' wealth should be 
imputed to the Defendant in calculating child support. The 
Plaintiff does not argue that the wealth of the Defendant's 
parents should be imputed to the Defendant but instead argues the 
Defendant's standard of living should be considered and that her 
income from every source and her total discretionary income be 
considered as is required by Utah law Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985). The trial court failed to base its decision on 
these factors. 
The cases cited by Defendant, Spector v. Spector, 496 
P.2d 864, (Ariz. App. 1972) Dickens v. Dickens, 187 P.2d 91, 94-
95 (Cal. App. 1947), and Fine v. Fine, 173 P.2d 355, (Cal. App. 
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1946) are not Utah cases, and therefore are not controlling. 
Fine , Supra, is factually different from the instant case and 
cannot be applied. The Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the 
expense of visiting with the children and the importance to the 
children of their continued contact with their father. The 
amount of child support is unrealistic in light of factors 
outlined by state statute and case law which must be conidered. 
The Defendant and the children live at a much higher standard of 
living than the Plaintiff, even without any employment or 
support, and they still collect substantial child support, 
leaving the Plaintiff with no discretionary funds. 
The Defendant alleges in her brief at pg. 22 that the 
Plaintiff's monthly expenses as set forth at trial were inflated. 
However, the Record reveals that the Plaintiff had substantial 
expenses which were set forth accurately (R. at 536). 
The Defendant also alleges that the cases cited by the 
Plaintiff in his brief at pages 39 and 40 are irrelevant. An 
examination of these cases will reveal that they support 
Plaintiff's position. As in Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1983) the Defendant's real discretionary income is much 
higher than the Plaintiff's. The Plaintjlff argues that as in 
Graziano v. Graziano, 321 P.2d 931 (Utah 1958) the Plaintiff's 
support obligation should be based on his ability to pay and the 
Defendant's need. The Plaintiff's desire to sustain an ongoing 
relationship with children together with the expenses and 
scheduling conflicts of so doing should be taken into 
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consideration along with both parties respective needs and 
ability. The Defendant's assets and standard of living indicate 
there is no need for $650.00 per month in child support and in 
light of the circumstances of this case such an award is 
inequitable. 
POINTE V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE VALUATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
ASSETS 
The Plaintiff has adequately set forth in his brief at 
pgs. 41-48 how the Trial Court abused its discretion in its 
valuation and distribution of the martial assets. 
The Defendant alleges on pg. 23 of her brief that the 
Plaintiff's arithmetic is indecipherable in calculating his claim 
that the Defendant was awarded 97 percent of the martial estate. 
In support of the Plaintiff's contention that the Defendant 
received 97 percent of the marital estate the Plaintiff submits a 
chart attached as Addendum Exhibit "B". 
The Plaintiff has clearly shown in his brief at pgs. 
41-48 that the trial court ignored the evidence which was 
presented to it when it placed values upon the marital assets and 
failed to apply the law in dividing them. 
A. 
Household Furnishings 
The Plaintiff has clearly shown in its brief at p. 45 
how the Trial Court erred in placing a value of $5,000.00 upon 
the household furnishings in the Defendant's possession which 
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were awarded to the Defendant. 
The Defendant presented an Exhibit at trial (Defenan-
dant's Exhibit 1) which is attached to this Reply Brief as 
Addendum, Exhibit "C" , In that exhibit, paragraph 3, the 
Defendant herself values these assets at $10,000.00. The 
Defendant introduced no other evidence as to the value of these 
assets. The Defendant's statement on pagq 24 of its brief that 
the Defendant "never valued the household goods at $10,000.00 is 
a complete misstatement, as is the Defendant's statement at pg. 
24 that "The Findings of Fact (Record 257) Paragraphs 7(c) and 
(j) are identical to Defendant's Exhibit 1, paragraphs 3 and 10". 
This is simply not true. The Plaintiff has set forth in its 
brief at page 45 why the preponderance of t^ he evidence mandated a 
finding that the furnishings were worth mor^ e than $10,000.00. 
B. 
Clothing 
The Plaintiff has clearly shown in his brief at pg. 42 
how the Court erred in assigning a zero value to the Defendant's 
clothing. Contrary to the Defendant's assertion that the Plain-
tiff presented no evidence on the value of the parties' clothing, 
the Plaintiff elicited the value of the Defendant's clothing from 
her through cross-examination. She testified that her clothing 
was worth $5,000.00 (R. at 101) and whether Plaintiff produced 
evidence as to the value of his own clothihg is irrelevant to the 
gross failure of the trial court to make is valuation of the 
Defendant's clothing based upon the evidence presented. 
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c. 
Valuation of Rental Property 
The Plaintiff has adequately set forth in his brief at 
pgs. 43 and 44 that the value of the rental property was 
substantially overvalued by the Trial Court, 
In response to the Plaintiff's claim that the valuation 
of the rental property did not accurately reflect an existing 
encumbrance of $25,000.00 to the Defendant's parents, the 
Defendant cites for the reviewing Court's reference an exhibit 
which was not presented to the trial court (Defendant's Brief at 
p. 27). Plaintiff has attached a certified copy of said exhibit 
as Addundum, Exhibit "D", and concluded that a review of said 
document would indeed set forth the discrepancy resulting in 
improper and inadequate Findings of Fact. 
The Defendant states in its brief that the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce provides that the Plaintiff should receive the 
property free of all liens except the existing mortgage 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 27). Yet the Decree states no such 
thing; it merely provides that the Plaintiff would receive the 
property free of any claims by the Defendant. It makes no 
mention of claims or interests of third parties. (R. at 244 & U 
6) 
Contrary to the Defendant's assertion on page 28 of 
Defendant's Brief that the Defendant assumed the $25,000.00 when 
she assumed the marital residence, the Decree provides only that 
the martial residence is subject to a contract balance of 
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$85,050.00.(R at 246 paragraph 7(a) Nowhere in the findings does 
the Defendant hold the Plaintiff harmless from this obligation* 
Although the Defendant may have promised that the Porters would 
provide a Quit Claim Deed to the Plaintiff, the question arises 
as to whether this binds the Porters to actually do so. The 
obvious answer is that it does not. Therefore, the Plaintiff is 
correct in his assertion that the rental property was shown at 
trial to be subject to a $25,000.00 lien to the Porters and that 
the trial court erroneously failed to take this into 
consideration when it made its valuation of the rental property. 
D. 
Martial Property and Employee Savings Plan 
The Plaintiff has adequately set forth in his brief at 
pgs. 42, 43, and 44 that the Court undervalued the marital 
residence awarded to the Defendant and over-valued the Employee 
Savings Plan awarded to the Plaintiff. 
E. 
Lack of Candor 
The Plaintiff has adequately set forth in its Appellant 
brief at pgs. 45 and 46 how the Defendant demonstrated a lack of 
candor. The quotation cited by the Defendant regarding the 
Plaintiff's lack of candor is out of context and is in regard to 
the Plaintiff's statements about custody and nothing else. The 
Trial Court's statement demonstrates Court bias more than it 
establishes anything regrading the Plaintiff's candor. (R. at p. 
363.) 
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The record demonstrates that the Plaintiff was 
forthright and the Defendant was not. 
F. 
Division of the Assets 
The Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that the 
division of the property was unfair to him. It is indisputable 
that the Plaintiff contributed financially far more to the 
marriage than did the Defendant's parents (Plaintiff's brief at 
pg. 47) This is in direct contradiction to the Trial Court's 
statement that the overwhelming majority of the parties' assets 
were contributed by the Defendant's parents. (R. at 329) Even if 
the bulk of the marital assets were contributed by the Defen-
dant's parents, they are still joint property unless proven to 
have been intended as a gift for the Respondent alone Workman v. 
Workman , 652 P. 2d 931 (Utah 1982). The Trial Court's 
presumptions seem to have exluded case law precedent to the 
distribution of marital assets, and has resulted in a gross 
inequitable distrubition of property. 
POINTE VI 
THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF THE 
APPELLANT COURT SHOULD NOT BE 
RESTRICTED. 
D e f e n d a n t ' s p r e l i m i n a r y s t a t e m e n t h a s s o u g h t t o 
r e s t r i c t t h e s c o p e of t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e A p p e l l a n t C o u r t i n 
r e v i e w i n g t h e c a s e on a p p e a l . 
B e r g e r v . B e r g e r , 7 1 3 , P . 2 d , 695 (Utah 1985) h e l d a s a 
s t a n d a r d f o r r e v i e w t h a t " . . . t h i s c a s e i s i n e q u i t y and we a r e 
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free to review both the law and the facts, Utah Const. Art VIII 
Section 9". 
The presumption outlined in Defendant's brief citing 
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (Utah 1986) that the reviewing court 
may afford considerable deference to the judgment of the trial 
court and treat its findings with a presumption of validity, is 
based upon the trial court's advantageous position which is given 
up when 
"... the judgment of the court was not in fact a 
judicial determination, but was conceived in 
aggravation and not based on any evidence as the 
court candidly states. This statement robs the 
matter of the exercise of sound discretion ... 
must be and is hereby reversed." 
Crites v. Crites, 322 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 1958| 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985): 
"...the trial Court must exercise its discretion 
in accordance with the standards that have been 
set by this Court." 
Currently the Utah Supreme Court is evaluating 
standards of review needed to protect equal protection and due 
process. The findings of the current Task Force on Gender Bias 
in the Utah Judicial System may define a standard of review 
whereby the "presumption of validity" may be modified. Perhaps 
the U.S. Supreme Court said it best in Stanley v. Illinois, 
Supra, 
P r o c e d u r e by p r e s u m p t i o n i s a l w a y s c h e a p e r and 
e a s i e r t h a n i n d i v i d u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . But w h e n , 
a s h e r e , t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r e c l o s e s t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e i s s u e s of compe tence and c a r e , when 
i t e x p l i c i t l y d i s d a i n s p r e s e n t r e a l i t i e s i n 
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difference to past formalities, it needlessly 
risks running roughshod over the important 
interests of both parent and child. It therefore 
cannot stand. 
POINTE VII 
DEFENDANTS BRIEF HAS 
MISSTATED THE RECORD 
The following chart identifies a number of instances 
wherein Defendant's brief has misstated or misrepresented the 
record: 
Defendant's Misstatements or Cite Defendant's Factual Statement Cite Record 
Misrepresentation Brief 
Custody with specific 
visitation. 
Failure to acknowledge 
Plaintiff's answer to 
Defendant's Counterclaim. 
Statement that Plaintiff 
accused Defendant of 
child abuse. 
Statement that Plaintiff 
earns approximately 
$36,500.00 per year. 
Absent from the record 
is an objection by the 
Plaintiff concerning 
judicial bias or a 
preservation of the 
"coercion" issue... 
pgs. 2, 3, 4, 5 
7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 15, 16 
pgs. 2, 3, 4, 7 
8, 10, 11, 12, 
15, 16 
pgs. 2, 4, 14 
Pg- 3 
Custody subject to at p. 3 
minimum visitation. 
Answer to Counter- at p. 25 
claim. 
Actual statement: at p. 624 
"no, that's not lines 24, 
what I said and I 25 
didn't mean that, 
Defendant testified p. 426 
that Plaintiff's 
net monthly income 
the year prior, 
1985,was approxi-
mately $1,500.00 
with bonuses rang-
ing in gross 
amounts between 
$5,000 -$10,000 
annually. 
See hearing on R. at 349, 
Motion for New lines 2-25, 
Trial and 350 
lines 1-20 
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The Court weighed the 
Plaintiff's earning 
ability, the Defendant's j 
earning ability, and 1 
the expenses of both l 
parties. 
Plaintiff improperly 
identifies his 
expenses. 
Defendant misstates the 
terms of the Contract 
referred to in Defendant's 
brief. 
P8- 19 | 
! pg. 22 
\ Pg- 27 
If We take her R. at 330 
ability to make 
$700.00 a month 
net, and his 
ability to make 
$2,000.00 a month 
net, we come up 
with $1,350 being 
hal£... 
Plaintiff properly R. at 536 
identified his 
expenses with 
supporting docu-
mentation. 
See attached R. at 554 
! Addendum, 
Exhibit "D" 
P0INTE VIII 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE 
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
Utah law provides for the award of attorney's fees upon 
the basis of reasonableness and need. Defendant's brief at pp. 
31 and 32 has imsrepresented the facts of Savage v. Savage, 658, 
P.2d 1021 (Utah 1983) where Defendant states that Savage, Supra, 
is not applicable to the case at bar, arguing that a greater 
income disparity existed in Savage, Supra, which was the basis 
for said award. 
An evaluation of the entire Savage, Supra, case 
demonstrates proportionately similar facts regarding financial 
ability, and accordingly Attorney's fees should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff has had to bring this case on appeal in order 
to clarify the findings of the lower Court and to seek correction 
of the inequities so imposed. Plaintiff has suffered a great 
financial hardship in this process and seeks appropriate 
remedies• 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth in this reply brief 
and in the Appellant brief, and in acccordance with the provi-
sions of the 9th and 14th ammendments to the U.S. Constitution 
extending "due process" and "equal protection" under the laws, 
the Utah Court of Appeals should direct that: 
1. Custody be awarded to the Plaintiff and a new 
trial be granted on the issues of support and property divisions, 
or 
2. A new trial be granted on all the issues with 
temporary custody awarded to Plaintiff until such time that a 
trial may be held. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, thisJld day of July, 1987. 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. 
SUMMERHAYS 
C2& HLfUstZ. 
Lowell V. Summerhay 
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I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) copies 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, this 2,*7 day of 
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James P. Cowley, Esq. 
William H. Christeinsen, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
WATKISS AND CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt lake City, Utah 84101 
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Addendum 
A. Custody Issues Raised at Trial 
B. Division of Marital Assets 
C. Financial Statement 
D. Uniform Real Estate Contract 
E. "Child Protective Divorce Laws: 
A Response to the Effects of 
Parental Separation on Children" 
Family Law Quarterly, Volume XVIIl 
Number 3, Fall 1983 
CUSTODY ISSUES RAISED AT TRIAL 
Addendum, Exhibit "A" 
BASED UPON CASE LAW PRECEDENT ISSUE WAS TRIED 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Removal of the children 
from the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
Use of the children as a 
club against the other. 
Willingness of the parent 
to place the welfare of 
the children before their 
desires. 
Desire and ability of the 
parties to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care 
for the children. 
Flexible job hours of the 
parties. 
Bonding. 
McGonigle v. Mcgonigle 
112 Colo. 572; 151 P.2d 978 
Miller v. Miller 
271 P.2d 411 (Colo. 19$4) 
Quinn v. Quinn 
412 So.2d 649 (La. App. 1982) 
Porter v. Martin 
434 N.E.2d 885 (Ind App. 1982) 
Hale v. Hale 
429 N.E.2d 340 
'Goode v. Goode 
415 So.2nd 321 (La.Ct.App. 1982) 
Hutchison v. Hutchison 
649 P.2d 38 (Utah, 198£) 
Lembach v. Cox 
639 P.2d 197 
Boals v. Boals 
664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983) 
Nilson v. Nilson 
652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1982) 
Prentice v. Prentice 
322 N.W. 2d 880 (S.D. 1982) 
Meltzer v. Witsberger 
445 A.2d 499 (Pa. Super. 1982) 
Walton v. Coffman 
169 P.2d 97 
F.L.Q. Article, Volume XVII, 
Number 3, Fall 1983 (Addendum E) 
R. 
R. 
R. 
R. 
R. 
R 
at 
at 
at 
at 
at 
421 
424, 
522, 
520, 
592 
. at 568 
425 
523 
521 
BASED UPON CASE LAW PRECEDENT ISSUE WAS TRIED 
7 Desire of the parties 
to protect the childrens 
right to know the other 
party• 
Frazier v, Frazier 
147 S. 464 (Fla. 1933) 
Rohr v. Rohr 
709 P.2d 382 (Utah 1985) 
R. at 575, 576, 
and 569 
8 Emotional condition of 
the parties. 
Pennington v. Pennington 
711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985) 
Moody v. Moody 
715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985) 
Morel v. Morel 
647 P. 2d 605 (Alaska 1982) 
Hogge v. Hogge 
649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) 
Humphreys v. Humphreys 
520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) 
R. at 500, 501, 
and 562 
9 Misleading statements 
made by a party* 
'Carpenter v. Carpenter 
645 P.2d 476 
R. at 421 
10 The stability of 
the parties. 
Morel v. Morel 
647 P.2d 605 (Alaska 1982) 
Craig v. McBride 
639 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1982) 
In re. Custody of Pearce 
456 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super 1983) 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen 
599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) 
R. at 525 
11 Help from Grandparents 
for the children. 
Lambauch v. Cox 
639 P.2d 197 
Eschbach v. Eschbach 
56 N.Y.2d 167; 
451 NYS 2d 658 (1982) 
R. at 336 Ln. 4 
12 The ability of the parties 
to help the children with 
academic needs. 
Michelli v. Lipari 
417 P.2d 493 (La.Ct.App. 1982) 
R. at 568, 619 
BASED UPON CASE LAW PRECEDENT ISSUE WAS TRIED 
12 The ability of the parties 
to help the children with 
academic needs, (cont'd) 
13 Religious training of the 
children provided by the 
parties. 
14 Willful disobedience of 
court orders. 
Faria v. Faria 
38 Conn.Supp. 37, 456 A.2d 
1205 (1982) 
U.C.A., 1953, 
Section 78-3A-39(12) 
PHall v. Hall 
439 A.2d 447 (Conn.1982) 
R. at 336 
R. at 619 
R. at 583 
1 • C r i t e r i a f o r D e c i d i n g C h i l d C u s t o d y i n t h e T r i a l and 
A p p e l l a t e C o u r t , by J e f f A k t i n s o n , Fami ly Law Q u a r t e r l y , Volume 
X V I I I , Number 1, S p r i n g 1984 . 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . I b i d . 
4 . I b i d . 
5 . I b i d . 
Addendum, Exibit "B" 
Division of Marital Assets 
Plaintiff's Vaulation 
Marital Residence: 
Defendant's Valuation 
7389 South 1710 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Rental Property 
7238 South 1710 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Barbara Ebbert's 
clothing, jewerly 
Household Furnishings 
in Eddie Ebbert's 
possession 
Household Furnishings 
in Barbara Ebbert's 
Possession 
Eddie Ebbert's vested 
savings plan 
TOTAL VALUE 
OF ESTATE 
$150,000.00 
no mortgage 
$ 73,500.00 FMV 
48,000.00 Mortgage Balance 
25,000.00 Lien-Porters 
$ 500.00 Equity 
$ 5,000.00 
less than $1,000.00 
$ 31,000.00 aprox. 
$ 4,019.20 
$191,519.00 
$129,000.00 
85,000.00 
$ 43,950.00 
$ 79,000.00 FMV 
44,000.00 M. Bal. 
$ 35,000.00 Equity 
-0-
$ 5,000.00 
$ 5,000.00 
$ 9,466.00 
$ 98,416.00 
Total Value 
Received 
Total Value 
Received 
of 
by. 
of 
_by 
Assets 
Plaintiff 
Assests 
Defendant 
$ 5,019.00 
2.6% of total 
estate 
$186,000.00 
97.1% of total 
estate 
$ 48,538.00 
49% of total 
estate 
$ 48,950.00 
51% of total 
estate 
Financial Statement 
Eddie C. Ebbert & 
Barbara Ann Ebbert 
October 31, 1985 
Assets: 
^ 1. Residence occupied by Barbara Ebbert 
at 7389 South 1710 East, fair market 
value $129,000, less contract balance 
of $85,050 
D
 2. Rental property at 7238 South 1710 East, 
fair market value $79,000, less mortgage 
balance of $44,000 
^ 3. Pots, pans, appliances, carpets, furni-
ture and utility utensils located in 
residence occupied by Barbara Ebbert 
P 4. Painting by Salvadore Dali 
D 5. Camera equipment and projector 
r\ 6. Patio furnishings 
0 7. Garden implements 
P 8. Cash on hand with Barbara—approx. 
P 9. Cash on hand with Eddie--est. 
f lO. Eddie Ebbert's vested savings plan with Allied Corporation as of 9/30/85 
P 11. Household furnishings, fixtures, appli-
ances, etc. in possession of Eddie 
Ebbert, including two book cases -- est. 
P 12. Barbara Ebbertfs clothing, personal 
effects, jewelry, etc. 
P 13. Eddie Ebbert1s clothing, personal effects, jewelry, etc. 
Page 1 of 3 
Liabilities: 
P 1. Mountain States Telephone -- Barbara $95 
p 2. Mountain Fuel Supply -- Barbara 30 
p 3. Utah Power & Light -- Barbara 115 
P 4. Salt Lake City Water -- Barbara 110 
0 5. Salt Lake City Sewer -- Barbara & Eddie 143 
P 6. Taxes due on residential property-Barbara & Eddie 1,200 
P 7. Payable to Linnel McCullem for 
counseling -- Barbara & Eddie 1,300 
P 8. Note payable to Continental Bank --Barbara 3,500 
P 9. Account payable to ZCMI -- Barbara 135 
P 10. Account payable to Chalk Garden --
Barbara 2,700 
} 11. Account payable to First Interstate --
Barbara 465 
0 12. Account payable to Weinstocks --
Barbara 2 6 0 
h 13. Balance due Rowland Hall -- Barbara & 
Eddie 2063 
> 14. Account due ZCMI -- Eddie 500 
P 15. Account due Weinstocks --
Eddie 500 
* 16. Account due Sears -- Eddie 4,500 
P 17. Account due Colettes — Eddie 1,500 
"> 18. Account due Arthur Frank -- Eddie 566 
17 19. Account due Master Charge -- Eddie 1,500 
Page 2 of 3 
20. Account due Mountain Fuel -- Eddie 
21. Utah Power & Light -- Eddie 
22. Mountain States Telephone — Barbara & 
Eddie 
23. American Telephone & Telegraph -- Barbara 
& Eddie 
24. Westminster College -- Eddie 
25. Repayable to Eddie's father -- Eddie 
26. Estimated attorney's fees, both 
parties 
Total Assets 
Less Liabilities 
Net Worth 
$110,366 
(36,171) 
$74,195 
22 
65 
400 
130 
672 
1,200 
12,500 
$36,171 
Less Gifts from Mother & 
Father of Barbara $(80,333) 
Marital Net Worth 
l OF UTAH ) ss ITY OF SALT LAKE ) 
HE UNOERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
IT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY 
<FY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOFEGOING 13 
JE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
' ON FILE IN MY OFF ICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
NESS MY HAND-AND SEAL OF SAID COURT 
3Q-DAYOFy^ PXj « £ X -
VMMi MA UTY 
$(6 ,138) 
STATf 0~ LTAH j 
Co. ' sT ,' Or CI / * " LAKC , c b 
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Addendum, Exhibit MD" 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE:* 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this l s t day of :______ , A. D.f lfcJLL 
by and between A l h p r f N . Vnirtor- anH • h i f i M n * T. P n r f P T 
hereinafter designated a. the Seller, and E . C , E b b e r t a n d B a r b a r a A . E b b e r t , h i s 
w i f e , 
hereinafU 
as 1o in t 
tr designated as 
t e n a n t s 
the Buyer, of 
w i t h f u l l 
S a l t 
r i e h t s of 
Lake C i t y , 
s u r v i v o r s h i p 
Utah 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate ir 
the county of S a l t Lake
 s u u of U Uh, to-wit: 7389 So. 1710 East, Salt Lake Citr 
ADDRESS U t a h 
More particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 90, WILLOW HILL SUBDIVISION, PHASE iv, 
amended and extended according to the official plat 
thereof on file and of record in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
8. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for taid described premises the sum of . 
One Hundred Twenty-Eight Thousand and Nine Hundred -wi.-. ^ 128.900.00' 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order ___—_^_________-___—_-—-_-__-—_-__—_—_________.--___ 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: = - _ : - {% "0" 128 900 00 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ » *^'u shall be paid as follows 
In accordance with Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and by this reference incorporated herein. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the ^ - s t - day of _l-l__Y. , 10 8 3 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied mJU<aXl»CJ^MWX30CMafia«KlW»»^ to the reduction of th< 
principal. Interest shall be charged from d a t e o f a n y d e l i n q u e n c y • <on ; „ u n p a , d vniittn o f th , 
purchase price at the rate of t w e l v e a i f f l r
 cJnt ( ___L__%) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgag< 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of futun 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than aecordint 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
First Interstate Bank of Utah ' with an unpaid balance o 
I 9 0 , 0 0 0 , a. of June 1 , 1?83 > 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special Improvement district taxes covering Improvements to said prem 
ises now in the process of being installed, or which nave been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop 
erty, except the following !!_____• ' 1 _ ! 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed th 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to •»»»---< t w e l v e a n d *fr-~_-
(—12_b-%) per annum and payable in regular monthly insUllmen_;.*i_X_itf}_-H^^ 
_-J-3aLAi£Sc«X-J3^£vrXSX-^?_fc , . . . 
9. If the Buwr Hesir-t to exercise hi. right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli 
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume an< 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respec 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after data of this agreement, snail be paid by seller unles 
obligations 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of suci 
»unt as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upoi 
the purchase price «bove mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob 
tainfng said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments an< 
interest raU^wy-ed. shall not exceed the monthly payment* and interest rate aa outlined above. 
11. TH» w£A»v>,**-#• •#» - • - .11 ***** mnA •«.»«.-i#nt* of ev»rv kind and nature which art or which may be assesse* 
and which may become due on these premises during the life ot this sgreemenU ZAC}C f^lBDC_HiaiSXOU_Q«XQt_t-l-g)«_ 
OMXXere_Km_Mlft_Xg-»l^^
 |r \ -( 
The Seller further covenants and agreea that be will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property 
EXHIBIT "A' 
To that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated 
July 1, 1983, by and between Albert N. Porter and Justine L. 
Porter as sellers and E. C, Ebbert and Barbara A. Ebbert as 
buyers. 
The buyers shall pay to the sellers the sum of 
$25,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of real property 
owned by the buyers and located at 7238 South 1700 East. 
In addition, the buyers shall pay to the sellers the 
sum of $550.00 on or before the 15th day of July, 1983 and 
the sum of $550.00 on or before the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter until the buyers have paid to the 
sellers the total principal sum (including the $25,000.00 
referred to above) of $128,900.00 (without interest). 
At the request and demand of the sellers, made on or 
before May 26, 1990, the buyers shall pay to the sellers on 
May 26, 1990 the remaining unpaid balance due and owing here-
under. 
ALSEftT k . POftTfiR 
3TJ3T IWr-ft&fr'** 
fc. C. EBBERT 
BARBARA A. EB&EkT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 33 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I THE UNOERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
C O U R T O F T A I T LAKE COUNTY, UTAH DCI HEREBY 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING S 
A W i « • FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE IN MY OFF ICE AS SUCH CLERK 
SBZ&P? SSL 
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I THE U. Sir* 2 .50 CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT C O A L ~ L A i x C C X T / J , 1 - ?Z l u " 3 Y 
CLR1.FY 1 H T ^ Z " V ' K I S A f ' D i O r i . " > l ^ 2 »3 A 
T R j c ' i ^ r ^ : r r / o . «c~ p A .DJCIAJ INT 
O \ n r " i f ^ O T I O C ; : . . - * ' 
\ M T \ « 3 ^ v , * 2 J iO SJLsL C r SWD COURT 
THIS^1_D«Y O^J^L£U 19X7 
W STIRLING EV,s?4SWLERK 
8Y .DEPUTY 
Addendu,m, Exhibit "E" 
Child Protective Divorce Laws: 
A Response to the 
Effects of Parental Separation 
on Children 
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR.* 
PAUL C. VITZf 
Recent studies in the field of psychology have shown that parental 
separation and divorce have substantial negative effects on children. 
Children whose parents separate commonly suffer from fear, worry, 
sadness, rejection, anger and guilt at th^ time of the separation. A 
surprisingly large number of the children of divorced parents suffer 
fron^  long-term difficulties with serious depression. Children suffer 
from the anxiety that they feel at the loss ofthe presence of a parent on 
*hom they have become dependent, the increase in conflict between 
parents that often accompanies divorce, ^nd the loss of the socializ-
ing influence of the departed parent. The harmful effects of parental 
separation and divorce lead many children to become involved in 
various types of antisocial behavior. 
The results of the recent studies concerning the effects of parental 
separation and divorce on childen have Significant implications for 
domestic relations law. Part I of this article examines the psychologi-
cal literature that shows the impact on children of parental separa-
tion and divorce. Part II discusses several means of attempting to pro-
tect the interests of the children in a divorce. It will argue (1) that the 
law should discourage divorce and give! parents an opportunity to 
•Associate Professor, School of La*, Peppcrdine University, Malibu, California; J D , 
University of Virginia 
Associate Professor of Psychologv New YOIK Un\c^i t>, Ph D , Stanford University 
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consider the negative effects of divorce on children by requiring a 
one-year's separation prior to the granting of a divorce where there 
are living minor children; (2) that independent legal counsel for the 
child in contested custody cases is not generally justified, but that 
judges should have the authority to call on the aid of experts from 
fields other than law in determining child custody; (3) that the law 
should protect the child's interest in substantial contact with both 
parents by approving joint custody where parents are able to agree to 
joint custody, by granting substantial visitation for children with the 
noncustodial parent in contested cases, and by setting statutory mini-
mum standards of parental visitation and support which are effective 
when parents are separated; and (4) that parents should be required 
to attempt to mediate child custody and visitation disputes for the 
primary purpose of reducing parental conflict. 
I. The Effects of Divorce on a Child 
A. Wallerstein and Kelly s Five- Year Study 
The most extensive, helpful and informative study of the effects of 
parental separation and divorce on children is that of Judith S. Wal-
lerstein of the School of Social Welfare of the University of California 
at Berkeley and Joan B. Kelly, a clinical psychologist. The results of 
that study were published in Surviving the Breakup: How Children 
and Parents Cope with Divorce in 1980.1 This study is the first to 
track systematically the effects of divorce on the same families for a 
period as long as five years. 
Wallerstein and Kelly investigated sixty families who voluntarily 
became involved in family counseling at the Marin County, Califor-
nia Community Mental Health Center at the time the parents were 
going through a divorce.2 Families were not included in the study if a 
child had a history of psychological difficulty, was in psychotherapy, 
was retarded, or was significantly below developmentally appropriate 
norms.' The families in the study were predominantly middle class.4 
Wallerstein and Kelly conducted extensive interviews of all of the 
1. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP. HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS 
COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) [hereinafter cited as WALLERSTEIN]. 
2. See id. at 4. 
3. See id. at 330. 
4. See id. at 307. 
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members of the families at the time of the divorce.5 They intended to 
complete the study with another set of interviews one year later, in 
light of the conventional wisdom which suggests that within one year 
the families would have adjusted to p e divorce.6 Wallerstein and 
Kelly found that eighteen months after the separation many children 
were experiencing great difficulties ind were still on a downward 
course.7 They decided to extend their study to five years after 
divorce.8 
1. THE CHILDREN AT SEPARATION 
The authors found that a significant number of the children, because 
of the separation of their parents, suffered fear, worry, sadness, feel-
ings of rejection, loneliness, anger and guilt.9 Less than 10 percent of 
the children felt relieved at the separation.10 The authors found that 
"(t]he central event in the divorce fropi the child's perspective is the 
physical separation of his parents/'11 
The initial reaction to the divorce otfover 90 percent of the children 
was one of strong fear and anxiety. The parental breakup brought 
"an acute sense of shock, intense fears, and grieving which the chil-
dren found overwhelming."12 
The children worried about who would provide for their needs.13 A 
very crucial fear at this time was one qf being abandoned.u The chil-
dren "concluded that if the marital 
child relationship could dissolve also 
being abandoned forever by the parent who had left and one-third 
tie could dissolve, the parent-
"
1S
 Half of the children feared 
5. See id. at 4. 
6. See id. at 5. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. at 45-50. 
10. See id. at 34. 
11. See id. at 36. 
12. See id at 35. The authors state: 
Mam burst into tears and pleaded with palrents to reconsider. Some prayed for God's 
help Soma, aae eight, firs? vomited, then hugged and kissed her mother, offering a 
new washing machine or clothes dryer to placate her. Several children asked, "Will I 
ever see my Daddy again?" A few had delayed reactions. Five-year-old Fred watched 
TV silently when told of the decision and a few days later began to sob, "We don't have 
a daddy anymore! I'll need a new daddyi" Several children panicked. Everett, age 
twelve, ran screaming through the house, ['You're trying to kill us all!" Id. at 40-41. 
13. See id. at 45. 
14. See id. at 46. 
15. Id. at 45. 
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had the same fear with regard to the custodial parent.16 They were 
preoccupied with the fear of waking to find both parents gone.17 
Older children, those between the ages of 13 and 18, worried about 
sex and marriage.18 Many of them feared marriage and had doubts 
about their competence as sex partners.19 
The children worried not only about themselves, but also about 
their parents.20 They worried about the ability of the absent parent to 
care for himself and about the custodial parent's suffering, depres-
sion, and physical health.21 
Wallerstein and Kelly state: 
Two-thirds of the children, especially the younger children, yearned for the 
absent parent, one-half of these with an intensity which we found profoundly 
moving." 
It did not appear that yearning for the father was rooted merely in a 
good predivorce relationship,23 but that it drew its sustenance from 
the child's developmental needs and fantasies.2A This yearning was il-
lustrated in the children's play which was observed as a part of the 
evaluation. The children played house with dolls. The mother and 
father dolls were always placed in the same house with the children, 
and generally the father and mother dolls were placed holding one 
another tightly.25 
Over one-half of the children in the Wallerstein and Kelly study 
suffered intensely from feelings oi rejection by one or both of their 
parents.26 Young children did not distinguish the absent parent's 
leaving them from his or her leaving the other parent.27 Many of the 
boys felt that criticism of the absent father by the mother was di-
rected at them.28 
The children felt lonely with the father gone and the mother work-
ing more. They felt both parents slipping out of their lives.29 This 
16. See id at 46 
17 See id 
18 Set id at 85 
19 See id at 86. 
20 See id at 47. 
21 See id 
22 Id at 46. 
21 See id at 47. 
24. See id 
25. See id 
26. See id at 48. 
27. See id 
28. See id 
29. See id 
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loneliness was present even in cases wh^re the children had not had 
gratifying relationships with their fathers while the families were 
together.30 
Over one-third of the children in the Wallerstein and Kelly study, 
especially the boys, showed feelings of anger.31 There was a rise in ag-
gression on the part of children of all ages. One-fourth of the children 
expressed this anger explosively toward one or both parents.32 The 
children saw divorce as an act of selfishness on the part of their par-
ents and felt that the parents had given primary consideration to their 
own needs.33 
The authors found that one-third olf the children assumed some 
significant amount of the blame for the breakup of the home and that 
young children up to the age of eight were more likely than older 
children to feel responsible for the separation of the parents.34 
Wallerstein and Kelly expected to fijnd in the children a sense of 
relief at the marital separation in direct proportion to the amount of 
marital discord.35 This was not the cas§. They found that only where 
the father had been violent and this violence had frightened a younger 
child was there a sense of relief;36 otherwise, the reaction to the di-
vorce was not linked to the quality of the relationship with the de-
parted parent.37 
In summary, Wallerstein and Kelly found that following the sepa-
ration of parents, almost all of the children studied suffered from fear 
and worry and that significant numbers of the children suffered from 
feelings of sadness, rejection, anger and guilt.38 
2. VISITATION 
Within the great majority of the families studied by Wallerstein and 
Kelly the children resided with the mother and the father had visita-
tion rights.39 This is the case in over 80 percent of post-divorce fami-
lies.40 Visitation rights of the noncustodial parents with the children 
30. See id. at 49. 
31 See id. at 50 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. at 53. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 45-50. 
39. See id. at 121. 
40. See id. 
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of the Wallerstein and Kelly study were typically ordered by judicial 
decree or established at the suggestion of the attorneys.41 Generally 
the children were given twice-monthly overnight or weekend visits 
with the noncustodial parent.42 
The exercise of visitation rights by the noncustodial parent varied 
substantially. Almost 20 percent of the Wallerstein and Kelly chil-
dren saw the noncustodial parent two or three times a week.43 Other 
children seldom, if ever, saw the noncustodial parent.44 One-fourth 
of the children in the study were visited infrequently and erratically.45 
It must be remembered that these were the children of parents both of 
whom had volunteered to be involved in post-divorce counseling. It is 
reasonable to assume that other noncustodial parents as a group 
would probably be less inclined to seek and exercise visitation rights. 
Visitation is a difficult time for separated parents. They will gen-
erally have some contact with one another. They are reminded of the 
good times that they miss and of the bad times that give rise to old 
feelings of hostility. Wallerstein and Kelly found that, during the first 
year, two-thirds of the mothers and four-fifths of the fathers felt 
stress from the visits.46 One-fifth of the mothers saw no value in the 
visits, and actively tried to sabotage them.47 One-third of the 
children, most often the older children, were consistently exposed to 
intense anger at the time of the visits.48 
The study showed that depressed fathers and guilty fathers avoided 
visitation.49 The depressed fathers, generally those who had been re-
jected by their wives, "were preoccupied with their own shame, grief 
and lowered self-esteem."50 Some fathers who felt guilty for having 
ended the marriage avoided visitation because the contact with their 
children reminded them of their guilt.51 At times, such fathers would 
start a flurry of guilt-ridden visitations, which was rarely sustained.52 
41. See id. at 132-133. 
42. See id. at 132. 
43. See id. at 135. 
44. See id. at 137. 
45. See id at 136. 
4b. See id. at 125. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 127. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. at 128. 
52. See id. 
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Other fathers used visitation as a weapon against the mother and 
exercised visitation only for so long as the visits seemed to harass the 
mother.53 
Children do not understand the complicated psychological forces 
within parents that lead to infrequent cjr erratic visitation. A lack of 
visitation reinforces any feelings a child may have that he or she is to 
blame for the divorce. Visitation is seen by the children as a reflection 
of the noncustodial parent's love for them, and a lack of visitation as 
his rejection of them. 
Wallerstein and Kelly state that "children expressed the wish for 
increased contact with their fathers wijh a startling and moving in-
tensity. . . . Complaints about insufficiency of parental visits were 
heard not just from those youngsters w i^o rarely saw the absent par-
ent, but from many who were being. visited rather frequently as 
well."54 The authors found that "[t]hp intense longing for greater 
contact persisted undiminished over m$ny years "55 Although 40 
percent of the children saw the noncustodial parent at least once a 
week and almost half of those saw hin} two or three times weekly,56 
only 20 percent of all the children were Reasonably content w ith their 
visiting situations.57 Not only did the children desire more visitation, 
but "boys and girls of various ages whol had been doing poorly at the 
initial assessment were able to improv^ significantly with increased 
visiting by the father."58 
3 THE CHILDREN FIVE YEARS AFTER ? H E SEPARATION 
Wallerstein and Kelly did their final evaluations of the children five 
years after the divorce. At that point, 34 percent of the children were 
coping quite well and had high self-esteem.59 For these children the 
divorce might have been a sad event, but it did not continue to make 
them aggrieved or angry at either parent. These children generally 
benefited from having stable, loving relationships with both parents 
after the divorce.60 Regular, frequent visitation with the noncustodial 
53 See id at 129 
54 Id atH4 
55 Id 
56 See id at 135 
57 See id at 143 
58 Id at 219 
59 See id at 209 
60 See id at 215. 
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parent was found to be a key factor contributing to the success of the 
children within this group, especially among the youngest children.61 
A second group of children in the study were classified in the mid-
dle range of psychological health as doing reasonably well.62 This in-
termediate category included 29 percent of the children.63 Though 
classified as doing reasonably well, those within this middle range 
"continued to show significant residues of their continuing anger in 
their persistent emotional neediness, unhappiness and somewhat 
diminished self-esteem."64 
The most surprising and disturbing finding of the Wallerstein and 
Kelly study was that five years after the divorce, children within the 
third group, consisting of over one-third of the children, were "con-
sciously and intensely unhappy and dissatisfied with their life in the 
post-divorce family."65 Thirty-seven percent of the children were 
classified as "moderately to severely depressed."66 Unhappiness was 
actually greater at five years than it had been at one-and-a-half years 
after the divorce.67 The following description of the play of an eleven-
year-old member of this group is illustrative: 
As Barbara entered the playroom, she busied herself with a dollhouse and 
began to construct a fantasy story which could have been a childish rendition of 
Waiting for Godot. She arranged the family dolls around the dinner table, 
which was set with careful attention to detail. The dolls in all their finery sat 
quietly awaiting the imminent arrival of the daddy doll who never appeared. It 
soon became clear that "waiting for daddy" was a central fantasy which was 
repeated endlessly as if frozen in time.68 
The findings of the Wallerstein and Kelly study are especially dis-
turbing when we take into consideration the following statement of 
the authors: 
[TJhe children within our study probably emerged at least somewhat or per-
haps considerably better than a comparable group of children from nonstudied 
divorcing families by virtue of our limited intervention; the fact that we attracted 
parents with some continuing commitment to their children to participate in the 
study in the first place; and that the children were a relatively sturdy group of 
youngsters in that they had not been referred For psychological treatment at any 
time in their lives and had achieved age-appropriate learning and behavior 
61. See id. at 219. 
62. See id. at 213. 
63. See id. 
64. Id. at 213. 
65. Id. at 211. 
66. Id. 
67. See id. 
68. It. 
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within the school, despite their experiences and unhappiness within the failing 
and conflicted marriages. They were, moreover, drawn from a predominantly 
white, middle-class population and had been relatively protected from eco-
nomic and social privation. It may well be that there would be considerably 
greater emotional decline among childrep in a general population.69 
B. John Bowlby: Attachment, Separation, Anxiety, and Anger 
The findings of Wallerstein and Kelly provide substantial support in 
the parental separation and divorce [setting for the theories and exten-
sive clinical observations of the English psychiatrist-psychoanalyst, 
John Bowlby. Bowlby's three volupes, Attachment,10 Separation: 
Anxiety and Anger,11 and Loss: Sadness and Depression,12 power-
fully document the damaging effects on a child of his separation from 
a person who has regularly engaged in social interaction with and 
responded to him and to whom he has become attached/3 A child will 
turn to such a person for comfort when he is hungry, tired, ill, or 
alarmed. 
During the first year of life, a cliild develops an attachment with 
the person who engages in social interaction with him most often. 
Generally this will be his mother. By the second year of life the great 
majority of children have other attachment figures, including the 
father, but will continue to maintain a principal attachment with the 
mother.74 Unless a child is less than a year old, the separation of his 
parents therefore will generally result in his separation from an at-
tachment figure. 
Bowlby identifies three stages th^t arise from a child's separation 
from an attachment figure. The first phase is protest and is character-
ized by extreme and voiced anxiety over separation.75 The child seeks 
by all means available to recover the person to whom he was 
attached.76 
The next stage, despair, occurs sdmetime after the separation. The 
69. Id. at 307. 
70. J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT (1969) [hereinafter cited as ATTACHMENT]. 
71. J. BOWLBY, SEPARATION: ANXIETY AND ANGER (1973) (hereinafter cited as SEPARA-
TION). 
72. J. BOWLBN . Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION (1980). 
73. Bowlby refers to such an attachment figure as "mother" or "mother figure," but 
makes it clear that this person may or may not be t^ ie child's natural mother. See ATTACHMENT, 
supra note 70, at 303-4. 
74. See id. at 304-6. 
75. See id. at 27. 
76. See SEPARATION, supra note 71, at 26. 
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child is preoccupied with the attachment figure and is vigilant for his 
or her return;77 however, the child's behavior suggests increasing 
hopelessness.78 "He is withdrawn and inactive, makes no demands 
on people in the environment, and appears to be in a deep state of 
mourning."79 
The last stage is detachment. If the attachment figure returns at 
this stage, the child may seem remote and apathetic. There is a listless 
turning away.80 Through detachment the child learns to defend him-
self against the pain of separation. 
As Bowlby observes, Freud late in his career came to the conclusion 
that the primal anxiety in a child's life is not related to sex but results 
from the loss of a loved one. Freud said that "[mjissing someone who 
is loved and longed for is the key to an understanding of anxiety."81 
Bowlby finds that an often-documented response to the loss of one 
to whom a child is attached is an\ious attachment. A child will cling 
to another attachment figure87 or to the departed person w hen he or 
she returns.83 Though frequently labeled overdependency, Bowlby 
notes that it is actually a response by the child to the lack of confi-
77 See id 
78 See ATTACHMENT, supra note 70, at 27 
79 Id 
80 See id at 28 
81 S FREUD, INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS AND ANXIETY (1926), quoted in SEPARATION, supra 
note 71, at 27 
82 SEPARATION, supra note 71, at 211 13 Bow lb) points to the following illustration in 
which the investigator has just asked a mother whose husband deserted her and their four 
year-old daughter three months before, w hether her daughter sometimes wants to be cuddled 
Yes all the time just lately—onl> since he left (What do you do9) Well, if I'mnotbusv 
I sit down and nurse her, because—you know—she's continually clinging round me, 
she keeps saying, 'Do you love me9 Vou won't leave me, Mumm>, will you9'—and sol 
sit down and try to talk to her about it you know, but I mean at her age (about four), 
really you can't explain And she used to dress herself, but since m> husband's been 
gone, she's rehed on me for— well i»ver> mortal thing I've had to do for her At the mo 
ment I'm more or less letting her do what she wants I mean she s been upset in one 
way, and I don't want to upset her again Because I did put her in a nursery just after he 
went because I thought it might take her mind off things, you see but anyhow the 
matron asked if I would mind taking her aua\ because she said she just sat and cried 
all da> long I think she's got it into her head that because her Dadd\'s gone, and me 
taking her there and leaung her all day. she perhaps thought I d left her too you see 
So she was onl\ there a forthnight, and then 1 took her away But she's afraid of being 
left on her own I mean, if 1 go to the toilet. I have to take her with me, she won't even 
stay in the room on her own She's frightened of being left J NEWSON&E NEWSON 
FOLR YEARS OLD IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1968) quoted in id at 214 
83 Id at 26-27 
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dence that the attachment figure who i|s present will be accessible and 
responsive to him.84 
Other factors contribute to this anxlious attachment. The most in-
fluential are threats made by a parent to abandon the child and pa-
rental quarrels. As Bowlby writes, the threats to abandon the child 
"have the tremendous power they do have because for a young child 
separation is itself such a distressing and frightening experience or 
prospect."85 Bowlby observes further]: 
When parents quarrel seriousl) a risk thajt one or other will desert is always 
there . . 
. ,[W]hen a child is threatened w ith bei^ig abandoned by his parents, either 
as a disciplinary measure, or because of marital discord, the effects on him of 
any actual separation will not only be magnified but be likely to persist B6 
When parents separate, children are subject not only to the loss of 
the absent parent, but, as Wallerstein and Kelly found, to substantial 
fears that they will lose the other parent as well.87 
Bowlby also notes that anger is a frequent and very basic response 
to separation, a link which is illustrated in Wallerstein and Kelly's 
study.88 This anger is sometimes directed toward the person who has 
left and sometimes is displaced to ot^ ier targets. Angry behavior may 
be a reproach to the departed attachment figure, a reaction of de-
spair, an attempt to overcome obstacles to reunion, or an attempt to 
discourage the loved person from going away again.89 Anger at sepa-
ration may also become revengeful.r° 
The combination of anxious attachment and anger that a child 
84 Id at 212-13 
85 SEPARATION, supra note 71, at 215 
86 Id at 23^ 
87 See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 45-46 See also text supra accompanying notes 13 
hrough 17 
88 See id at 50 See also text supra accompanying notes 31 through 33 
89 See SEPARATION, supra note 71, at 246-47 
90 See id at 249 Bo* lb), cittng others * ho have recognized the link between separation 
md anger, gives some graphic examples of extreme anger 
[Ijn an early paper that calls attention to the traumatic effects of separation, 
Kestenberg (1943) describes a girl of thirteen who had been deserted b> her parents 
and who had been cared for bv a succession of other people She trusted no one and 
responded to any disappointment by some vengeful action During th course of treat-
ment this girl pictured herself as grow n up and so able to re\ cnge he* >t If on her mother 
by killing her Many analjsts who have treated patients with this type of background 
could give similar examples 
In (a] paper that relates anger to separation, Burnham (1965) makes brief refer 
ence to two patients who actually engaged in matricide One an adolescent who 
murdered his mother, exclaimed afterwards, "I couldn't stand to have her leave me " 
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feels toward the departed attachment figure causes painful conflicts 
within the child. Bowlby notes: 
[Anxious and angry behavior is] directed toward ihe attachment figure: anx-
ious attachment is to retain maximum accessibility to the attachment figure; 
anger is both a reproach at w hat has happened and a deterrent against its hap-
pening again. Thus, love, anxiety, and anger, and sometimes hatred, come to 
be aroused by one and the same person. As a result painful conflicts are inevi-
table.91 
In contrast to the child who is anxious about the accessibility and 
responsiveness of his attachment figures, the child who is confident 
about the accessibility and support of attachment figures can build a 
stable and self-reliant personality.92 Bowlby examines the evidence 
that secure relationships with attachment figures lead to a growth in 
self-reliance.93 He concludes: 
[J]ust as we found that there is a strong case for believing that gnawing uncer-
tainty about the accessibility and responsiveness of attachment figures is a 
principal condition for the development of unstable and anxious personality so 
is there a strong case for believing that an unthinking confidence in the unfail-
ing accessibility and support of attachment figures is the bedrock on which 
stable and self-reliant personality is built.9'' 
C. The Effect of Conflict within Families 
Some recent studies have indicated that the conflict between par-
ents, especially conflict after their separation, is psychologically de-
structive to children. 
A study by E. Mavis Hetherington examined seventy-two children 
of divorce during the two years following separation and seventy-two 
children of intact nuclear families.95 The problem behaviors and the 
Another, a youth who placed a bomb m his mother's luggage as she boarded an 
airliner, explained, *'I decided that she would never leave me again." The hypothesis 
proposed here [that separation anxietv arouses intense anger] makes these statements 
less paradoxical than they appear Id at 250-51, citing Kestenberg Separation from 
Parents, 3 NERV. CHILD 20-35 (1943), and Burnham, Separation Anxiety, 13 ARCHS. 
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 346-58 (1965) 
91. SEPARATION, supra note 71, at 253. 
92. See id at 322. 
93 Seeid at322-59 One studv cited b\ Bowlbws that ofMegargee, Parker, and Levine of 
488 unive^ sj % students that measured socian/ution with the California Personaht) Inventor}-
Socialization was found to correlate positive!) with those students living with both natural 
parents and negativelv with those students whose parents were divorced. See Megargee, Parker 
& Levine, Relationship of Familial and Social Factors to Socialization in Middle-Class College 
Students, 11 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 76(1971), cited mid. at339. 
94. Id at 322. 
95. Hetherington, Family Interaction and the Social, Emotional and Cognitive Develop-
ment of Children After Divorce, THE FAMILY. SETTING PRIORITIES 71 (V. Vaughn and T. 
Brazelton eds. 1979). 
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positive behaviors of the children were studied through extensive in-
terviews of parents and teachers and observations of the children at 
home and at school, two months, one year,) and two years following 
divorce.96 
During all of the measurement periods, the children from the in-
tact nuclear families in which there was low or moderate conflict were 
doing the best.97 The problems of children of intact nuclear families 
in which there was "intense continuing marital dissatisfaction and 
conflict,"98 as compared with the children of divorced single-parent 
families, varied with time. The author statps: 
In the first year following divorce, children in the divorced families were 
functioning less well than those in the high-discord nuclear families In this 
period, children from divorced families were more oppositional, aggressive, 
lacking in self-control, distractible, and demanding of help and attention in 
both the home and school than were children in families with high rates of 
marital discord. . . . 
By the end of two years following a divorce, the pattern of differences be-
tween children from stressed nuclear and divorced families was reversed " 
The study found that the children of divorced families in which 
there was high conflict after the divorce showed greater problems 
than any of the other children in the study at all three times that the 
children were evaluated. 10° The only exception was that girls in high-
conflict divorced families and girls in high-conflict nuclear families 
were experiencing the same high level of difficulty two years after 
divorce.101 
Doris S. Jacobson's study of fifty-one children whose parents had 
been separated within a year prior to the study examined the impact 
on children of interparent hostility after separation.102 The results of 
two tests were used and compared. One test measured the occurrence 
of incidents of interparent hostility and the other measured the chil-
dren's poor social adjustment behavior, such as aggression, hyper-
activity, social withdrawal, fear, and inhibition. The study found that 
interparent hostility after separation is qestructive to children, and 
96. See id. at 73. 
97. See id At 14. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. See id. at 76. 
101. See id 
102. 5eeJacobson, The Impact of Marital Separation/Divorce on Children II. Interparent 
Hostility and Child Adjustment, 2 J. DIVORCE 3 (1978)1 
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that "the greater the amount of interparent hostility, the greater the 
maladjustment of the child/'103 
The findings concerning the damage caused to children when there 
is conflict between their parents after separation is particularly dis-
turbing when coupled with the finding of Wallerstein and Kelly, as 
noted by Hetherington, "that bitterness and conflict between divorc-
ing parents escalated rather than diminished following separa-
tion/'104 
D. Social Adjustment and a "Whole Home": 
The Importance of the Father 
The separation from a parent is for a child a traumatic experience, 
which of itself has severe and long-lasting detrimental effects on a 
child's psychological well-being. A child also suffers in his other 
social adjustment when he is not raised in what Margaret Mead has 
called a "whole home,"105 that is, a home in which a father and a 
mother are present. She has said: 
One of the most important learnings for every human child is how to be a full 
member of its own sex and at the same time full y relate to the opposite sex. This 
is not an easy learning, it requires the continuing presence of a father and a 
mother to give it reality [A child] must >* atch both parents meet its spring-
ing impulse, watch both parents discipline and mould their own impulses so 
that the child is protected and at adolescence be set free by both parents to go 
out into the world.106 
The great importance of the father in Ihe development and educa-
tion of his children—sons and daughters—is one of the best docu-
mented findings within the social sciences in the last twenty years. 
The studies in this area give a clearer u nderstanding of the pathol-
ogies found in children of divorce. 
Psychologists and others have found that the father makes major 
contributions to a child's development, especially of its individual 
identity. He helps the child to separate psychologically from the 
mother; teaches it to control its impulses and to learn and respond to 
the laws, rules, and structures of the society; and serves as a buffer for 
the mother's attention and emotions (both affection and anger) that 
103. Id at 17 
104. Hetherington, supra note 95 at 76, citing WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1. 
105. M. MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE 359 (1949). 
106. Id. 
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may be heavily focused on the child J Thus, the father offers the child 
another reference point and a haven, and enables the child to avoid 
being overwhelmed by the mother. Also, by providing the mother 
with an adult to whom she can relate, the father helps to keep the 
mother from becoming overly involved with the children.107 
The studies have indicated that the detrimental effects of a father's 
absence on sons are somewhat different from those on daughters. 
Some of the regularly reported effects of father absence on sons are 
high aggressive behavior, strong preference for immediate gratifica-
tion, lack of social responsibility, intellectual deficits (among them a 
lower IQ by an average of seven points), low need for achievement, 
high delinquency potential, tendencies toward homosexuality, lack 
of trust in other males, and low selfjesteem.108 
The regularly reported effects ofI father absence on girls are in-
creased promiscuity (an increase often interpreted as a kind of search 
for the absent father and a general anxiety about male evaluation of 
self-worth), lack of independence, powered cognitive capacity, and 
lack of impulse control.109 
The importance of the father to children was recognized by Waller-
stein and Kelly. They observed: 
The children who felt rejected by the father were burdened in their psychologi-
cal functioning despite the presence of a good mother... . [T]he child contin-
ued to be aware of himself in regard to both parents and the tv, o-parent per-
spective remained significant despite legal and geographical separation and 
the passage of years. . . . 
[G]ood father-child relationships appeared linked to high self-esteem and 
the absence of depression in children of both sexes and at all ages. We were in-
terested to find this significant link in both sexes up to and including those in 
the thirteen-to-twenty-four age group. . . . 
[T]he importance of a good father-child relationship does not diminish in the 
divorced family for boys or girls and may, in fact, increase as the child ap-
proaches early adolescence. This finding carries social implications, especially 
since it is also our finding that older children do not attach readily to step-
fathers and that older children often resented the stepfather's presence in the 
family.110 
107. See e p FATHERS OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS (S. Cath, A Gurwitt and J. Ross 
cds 1982 J; Ross, Fathers in Dt velopment, PARENTHOOD AS AN ADULT EXPERIENCE (R. Cohen, 
B. Confer, S. Weissman, eds 1982) (m press); Hetherington, Children and Divorce, PARENT-
CHILD INTERACTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PROSPECT 33 (R. Henderson ed. 1980). 
108. See e.g. H. BILLER, FATHER, CHILD AND SEX ROLE (1971); J. CORTE'S, DELINQUENCY 
AND CRIME: A BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH (1972). 
109. See also Hetherington, Effects of Father Absence on Personality Development in 
Adolescent Daughters, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 313 (1972). 
110. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 218-20. 
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E. The Social Costs of Parental Separation and Divorce 
The relation of fatherless families to delinquency connects divorce 
with painful costs not just to the family itself, but to society in general. 
For example, Wallerstein and Kelly mention that in their sample of 
the 37 percent of the children who were classified as seriously un-
happy and depressed five years following divorce, they found many 
types of delinquency. Among them were sexual promiscuity, drug 
abuse, petty stealing, some alcoholism, and breaking and enter-
ing.111 The child Wallerstein and Kelly selected as representative of 
those functioning moderately well was also involved in criminal activ-
ity in shoplifting and "petty" stealing from her school.112 If the 
Wallerstein and Kelly sample had contained more children from 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds, violent crime would probably 
have been a greater part of the pattern. 
Clear and substantial evidence that broken homes are a major 
cause of juvenile crime has been in the literature for many years. 
Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck published a scale based on over 
twenty years of research that predicted delinquency in boys with ex-
tremely high accuracy—an accuracy seldom found in social science.113 
Their scale, used in many studies, contained five dimensions, all eval-
uations of family life. These were father's discipline of the boy, father's 
affection for the boy, mother's supervision of the boy, mother's affec-
tion for the boy, and the overall cohesiveness of the family.114 Divorce 
becomes a significant contributor on this scale to the likelihood of 
delinquency. 
A recent study by Harriett Wilson confirms the Gluecks' thesis in a 
contemporary British environment and points to the role of the father 
in reducing the likelihood of criminal activity in his sons.115 The study 
examined boys growing up in both inner city and suburban areas. It 
correlated juvenile delinquency with parental strictness, social han-
dicap, and parental criminality. Parental strictness w as measured by 
such factors as whether a child was required to be in at a certain time 
i l l See id at 211. 
112. See id at 213. 
113 See S. GLUECK & E GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950). 
114. See id at 261. 
115 See Wilson, Parental Supervision A Neglected Aspect ofDelinquency, BRITISH JOUR 
NAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1980) 
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and whether his mother could firid him when he was not at home.116 
Wilson summarizes her findings! as follows: 
[T]he delinquent rate in lax familiek is over seven times that in strict families; 
the rate in severely socially handicapped families is just under three times that 
in families with low social handicap;land the rate in families with a police rec-
ord of parental criminality is just under twice that in families with no police 
record. One thus concludes that supervision is the most important single factor 
in determining juvenile delinquency J. . . n 7 
Wilson's findings link divorce to delinquency, since close supervi-
sion is very difficult in a single parent family. As Hetherington notes: 
The single mother may confront specific problems of authority in discipline. 
Children view fathers as more powerful and threatening than mothers, and 
when undesirable behavior occurs, the father can terminate it more readily 
than the mother can.118 
In large families without a father, lax supervision of boys becomes 
very probable, and with it the tendency toward criminality increases 
substantially.119 
II. Protection of the Child's Interests 
As we have seen, substantial empirical evidence from the field of psy-
chology now establishes that parental separation has substantial, 
long-term negative effects on children. These effects arise from the 
anxiety a child experiences when he or she is separated from a parent, 
from the conflict between parents that often occurs when they sepa-
rate, and from the reduced influence of the noncustodial parent, gen-
erally the father, on the child. 
116. See id. at 212. 
117. Id. at 229-30. 
118. Hetherington, supra note 95 at 72 (Citation omitted). 
119. Other studies also link parental separation and divorce with criminal activity on the 
part of children. ' 
D. H. Russell, in a study of24 juvenile murderers, many of whom had shown no previous sign 
of turmoil before the crime, found that all of them were involved in a dependent maternal rela-
tionship, with a lack of countering support from the father; in short, there was severe conflict 
over passivity and aggression, in the context of a weak or absent father. See Russell Ingre-
dients of Juvenile Murder, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY 65 (1979) 
The lack of a father in the home may be a greater contributing factor to long-term problems 
with delinquency among girls than among boys. T. P. Monahan reported in 1957 the results of 
research into the backgrounds of over 44,000 delinquents. He states, "Of the white femaie reci-
divists, 68.6% came from broken homes v. 41.4% of the males; of the black female recidivists, 
80.2% came from broken homes v. 62.2% of the males." Monahan, Family Status and the 
Delinquent Child: A Reappraisal and Some New Findings, cited in J. Corte's, supra note 108, at 
221. 
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Laws related to parental separation and divorce should be eval-
uated in light of the effects of separation and divorce on children. The 
law should distinguish between families in which there are children 
and families without children, and the interests of the children 
should be protected. We will now evaluate several proposals in the 
parental separation and divorce area in respect to the interests of 
children. 
A. Discouraging Divorce 
The obvious question raised by the difficulties children suffer when 
parents separate is whether discouraging divorce would benefit chil-
dren. Wallerstein and Kelly give us the perspective of the children on 
the single-parent family vis a vis the intact family of an unhappy mar-
riage: 
Only a few of the children in our study thought their parents were happily mar-
ried, yet the overwhelming majority preferred the unhappy marriage to the di-
vorce Many of the children, despite the unhappiness of their parents, were 
in fact relatively happy and considered their situation neither better nor worse 
than that of other families around them. They would, in fact, have been con-
tent to hobble along. The divorce was a bolt of lightning that struck them when 
they had not even been aware of the existence of a storm.120 
E. Mavis Hetherington states, "the needs of children and parents 
are not always congruent—a solution that contributes to the well-
being of one may have disastrous outcomes for the other."121 As an 
example, she cites the findings of her study of mothers, fathers and 
preschool children in the two years following divorce.122 She states: 
A group of mothers were identified and labeled as egocentric, self-fulfilling 
mothers. They were among the women who recovered most rapidly from any 
adverse effects of divorce and who, by one year after divorce, reported that their 
current life was vastly preferable to their married life before the divorce. They 
viewed their current separation as happy, satisfying, and stimulating, and the 
initial increases in state anxiety, feelings of external control, and low self-
esteem, which were found in many women during the first year after divorce, 
dissipated rapidly in this group. These women had returned to school, begun to 
work, become involved with community activities, or pursued social activities 
and emotional involvements at a frenetic pace. However, they had gained their 
satisfaction at the expense of the well being of their children. The children of 
these self-fulfilling mothers had the most frequent, intense and enduring signs 
of emotional disturbance and behavior problems, both in the home and in the 
120. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
121. Hetherington, supra note 107, at 34. 
122. See Hetherington, supra note 95. 
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school. This was in part because, in their relentless egocentric pursuit of self-
gratification and search for a resolution of their own emotional problems, they 
spent little time with their children and iften did not recognize, or were unre-
sponsive to, their children's needs and distress.123 
In some cases, however, parental separation and divorce is prob-
ably best for the children in the ling run. As noted above,124 the 
Hetherington study found that in families where there was intense 
continuing marital dissatisfaction and conflict between parents, chil-
dren initially suffered detriment fro}n parental separation, but where 
parental conflict was avoided following separation, the children were 
doing better two years following the separation than children who re-
mained in intact but high-conflict families. 
The Wallerstein and Kelly study gives us some help in determining 
the number of divorces within families that fall into this high-conflict 
category. They found that one-third of the divorces they studied oc-
curred between parents who had unhappy marriages that were un-
likely to get better.125 Years of visible unhappiness made divorce in 
such instances an apparently "rational solution."126 In such cases 
children find divorce relatively easy to understand and accept. The 
divorces between parents described by Hetherington as having "in-
tense continuing marital dissatisfaction and conflict,"127 would fall 
within this category. 
To summarize, divorce is probably beneficial to children in the 
long run, if there has been intense continuing marital dissatisfaction 
and conflict between the parents during the marriage and the parents 
are able to avoid high conflict following divorce. For the substantial 
number of children of divorce who do not come from families in which 
there is intense continuing marital dissatisfaction and conflict, 
parental separation and divorce is generally more destructive than 
maintaining the intact family. 
Until recently, the law in Western countries made it very difficult 
for couples to divorce.128 Typical of the attitudes expressed by the 
123. Hetherington, supra note 107, at 34-35. 
124. See text supra accompanying note 99. 
125. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 95, at 74. 
126. See id. at 18. 
127. Hetherington, supra note 95, at 74. 
128. Generally, divorce was granted, if at all, only where the party requesting the divorce 
could establish that the other party had committed acts deemed by the lau to give the wronged 
party sufficient grounds for divorce. In the United States, the grounds for divorce varied sub-
stantially from state to state, but generally included adultery, cruelty, desertion, and convic-
tion of certain crimes. Divorce was granted only to the party who was without fault. 
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courts toward divorce is the following language of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia in 1911, citing an often-quoted English case: 
In this age, when divorces are so frequently sought, and, in some jurisdictions, 
so readily obtained for wholly insufficient cause, we cannot too strongly com-
mend the language of Sir William Scott, in Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. C. R. 35: 
"When people understand that they must live together, except for a few rea-
sons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke 
which they know they cannot shake off. They become good husbands and good 
wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a 
powerful master in teaching duties which it imposes."129 
The trend in recent years has been toward prompt, no-fault divorce 
at the request of either party. In 1970, what has been called the first 
comprehensive no-fault statute executed in the United States went 
into effect in California.130 It established "irreconcilable differences, 
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage" and 
incurable insanity as the only grounds for divorce.131 Iowa followed 
soon thereafter with a similar statute.1 n 
In 1970 a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners 
of Uniform State Laws proposed the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act (UMDA).133 Under the UMDA, divorce will be granted if a court 
finds that a marriage is "irretrievably broken." This finding must be 
supported by evidence that the parties have lived separate and apart 
for more than 180 days next preceding commencement of the pro-
ceeding or that "there is serious marital discord adversely affecting 
the attitude of one or both of the parties toward the marriage."134 All 
defenses to divorce are abolished.135 If one of the parties denies that 
Under several doctrines which were developed, courts refused to grant divorce even where 
fault grounds for divorce existed. Under the doctrine of recrimination, a divorce was denied 
where both parties were at fault. Where the parties cooperated to get the divorce, it was denied 
on the ground of collusion. If the party seeking the divorce enticed the other party to commit a 
fault ground, the divorce was denied on the ground of connivance, and where the innocent 
spouse had forgiven the other partner for his or her offense, the divorce was denied on the 
ground of condonation. A few states permitted divorce on the ground of incompatibility, but 
within those states the courts at times treated incompatibility as a fault ground for divorce and 
required strict proof of deep irretrievable conflict. Within a few other states divorce was al-
lowed based on the parties' living separate and apart for a period of time, without regard to 
fault. See generally Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 
35-63(1966). 
129. Haynor v. Haynor, 112 Va. 123,127, 70 S.E. 531, 532 (1911). 
130. SeeZuckman, The ABA Family Law Section v. the NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation 
and Forced Reconciliation Over the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 
61,61(1974). 
131. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4000-5138 (West 19701. 
132. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1.34 (West 1974). 
133. See Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 179, 187 (1973). 
134. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(2), 9AU L.A. 91 (1979). 
135. See d. §3*Ke). 
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the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court may continue the case 
for from thirty to sixty days and suggest that the parties seek counsel-
ing. The court may order a conciliation conference.136 
When viewed realistically, Section 302(2)(ii) of the UMDA permits 
divorce on demand of either party. A party desiring a divorce need 
only establish that "there is serious marital discord," which he or she 
could create, and that the discord has "adversely affected" his or her 
attitude toward the marriage.137 If tne responding party denies that 
there is irretrievable breakdown, presumably the petitioning party 
could create more "serious marital discord" to establish his or her 
right to a prompt divorce. 
The UMDA has been adopted by Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana and Washington.138 An addi-
tional twenty-four states will grant a divorce based on irretrievable 
breakdown.139 Nineteen states and the District of Columbia will 
grant divorce based on a period 0f separation ranging from six 
months to five years. ,4° Some states toat will grant divorce based on a 
period of separation will also grant divorce based on irretrievable 
breakdown.141 South Dakota is the Only state that still requires proof 
of fault grounds before a divorce will be granted.142 
The trend in the law toward prompt, no-fault divorce at the request 
of either spouse has greatly reduced the barriers that previously faced 
those who desired divorce. In addition to the removal of the legal bar-
riers, the change in laws has influenced the attitudes of people toward 
divorce. As Mary Ann Glendon has said: 
[I]n a legal system like that of the United States we cannot say that a change 
from what has been rather extensive legal regulation of marriage and family 
matters to "delegalization" is really neutral, or that the change in the law has 
no effect on the mores. In an indefinable but nonetheless real way, much of our 
law performs educational and hortatory, as well as legal, functions. In a society 
where there are few sources of common inspiration, the law in some instances 
can take on a sacred character, becoming what the sociologist Robert Bellah 
calls a "civil religion." . . . In such a society, laws like the Washington law per-
mitting unilateral divorce on demand have a certain, albeit unquantifiable 
moral significance. We must face the fact that in our society the law is not a 
136. See id. §305. 
137. See id. §302(2). 
138. See FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
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completely unimportant normative force. II interacts with and reacts upon 
social change I43 
A large portion of children whose parents divorce under no-fault 
divorce laws are worse off than they would have been had their par-
ents remained together. On the other hand, where the new laws en-
able parents to dissolve marriages in which there has been intense 
continuing marital dissatisfaction and conflict, they have probably 
been beneficial to the children. Although the requirement that one of 
the parties prove that the other was at fault in the break-up of the 
marriage kept some families together, the removal of that require-
ment has in many cases reduced the conflict which arises where there 
is a divorce. As we have seen, such parental conflict is especially de-
structive to children.144 
We propose that where husband and wife have living minor chil-
dren, no-fault divorce be granted only after a year's waiting period 
following the separation of the parents. Such a provision would per-
mit divorce, without the conflict generated by the requirement that 
fault be established, but would, to some extent, discourage divorce.145 
Such a waiting period would discourage divorce in three ways. It 
would do so first by presenting some barrier to one considering 
divorce. All marriages go through difficult times. Sometimes today 
the parties stick together and work through the hard times and fre-
quently develop a stronger marriage. In an earlier day the law in 
many cases would not permit divorce and thereby strongly encour-
aged marriage partners to adjust to one another. We propose that the 
law maintain at least a slight barrier to divorce in order to encourage 
partners to make adjustments to married life which would oe so 
beneficial to their children. 
Secondly, in requiring such a waiting period, the state would dem-
onstrate that it disapproves of divorce where children are involved. 
143 Glendon, Marriage and the State The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA L REV 
663, 719 (1976> (citation omitted) 
144 See supra notes 95 to 104 and accompanying text 
145 We are aware that our conclusion about the role of law in discouraging divorce differs 
with that of Wallerstem and Kelly They state 
We began our work with the conviction that divorce should remain a readily a\ailable option 
to adults who are locked into an unhapp) marriage Our findings, although somewhat 
graver than expected, have not changed our conviction Wallerstem and Kell>, California s 
Children of Divorce, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 67, 76, January, 1980 
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To the extent that society's mores ancj attitudes are influenced by the 
law, a year's waiting period will discourage divorce between parents 
of minor children. 
Thirdly, such a waiting period would afford the parents a greater 
opportunity to reconsider the decision to divorce. They will have the 
opportunity to see the effects of their separation on their children. 
Moreover, a year's waiting period will give them time to have a more 
objective view of any incident that may have caused the breakup. 
Requiring a one-year waiting period would be especially helpful 
where divorce is what Wallerstein and Kelly refer to as a "stress-
related response."146 This type of divorce relates to no clear marital 
unhappiness but results from some| outside stressful occurrence to 
one of the partners.147 Such an occurrence can so disturb a person 
that a previously satisfactory marriage is suddenly rejected, and the 
person breaks off the relationship ind pushes for divorce in an at-
tempt to escape depression. These divorces resulting from outside 
stress are notably hard for children t\o understand and bring a special 
burden to them, for the whole dissolution of the family makes no 
sense to them. Wallerstein and Kejly give an illuminating case his-
tory: 
Mrs. K. filed for divorce shortly after her mother died. Her husband, a gentle, 
devoted family man, was startled and begged her to change her mind, or at 
least to permit him to remain within the family home, since he had no place to 
go. The children cried and implored their mother to change her mind. Her 
oldest child tried to comfort her and spe^ nt many evenings with the sorrowing 
woman, trying gently to cheer her. Four years later, Mrs. K. told us, "I wish I 
could marry him again. I was upset. MV mother had died, and I felt that he 
wasn't sympathetic, and I filed for divorpe. It was a terrible mistake, but there 
is nothing to do now. I have ruined the lives of four people."148 
In a situation like Mrs. K.'s, a year's waiting period may give the 
spouse who is initiating the divorce the time properly to evaluate the 
relationship between the stress and the depression that he or she is ex-
periencing. The value of the marriage to parents and children may be 
recognized, and the parties may bh reconciled.149 
146. WALLERSTEIN, supra, note 1 at 19. 
147. See id. 
148. A/, at 20. 
149. In some cases, the year's waiting period should be coupled with counseling for the 
parents. Where divorce is a stress-related response, the parent who initiates the separation may 
need counsel,ng to deal with the underlying stress. Under Section 305 of the UMDA, where one 
party denies that a marriage is irretrievably broken, the court may continue the case for 30 to 60 
days and suggest that the parties seek counseling. See UMDA supra note 134, at 305. We pro-
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B. The Question of Independent Representation for the Child 
In recent years many writers have proposed that an attorney be ap-
pointed to represent the interests of children in contested custody 
cases.150 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit advocate the appointment of 
legal counsel for the child in contested custody cases. They state in 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: 
The law presumes that a child's parents are generally best suited to represent 
and safeguard his interests. That presumption, however, should not prevail, as 
it does, once the child's placement becomes the subject of a dispute between 
parents which they are unable to resolve without resort to the courts, as in a 
divorce or separation proceeding.151 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state further in Before the Best Interests 
of the Child: 
By failing to agree on a disposition [as to custody], separating parents waive 
their claim to parental autonomy and thereby their right to be the exclusive 
representatives of their child's interests. The child then requires representation 
independent of his parents to assure that his interests are treated as paramount 
in determining who shall have custody.152 
Theoretically, counsel for the child has been justified for two pur-
poses, that of factfinder and that of advocate for the interests of the 
child.153 However, when child custody is litigated, the child generally 
does not need legal counsel for either of these purposes. The role of 
factfinder is generally adequately filled by parents and their counsel. 
Each presents the good points of his or her side and the shortcomings 
of the other. Where the judge detects that the parties are avoiding 
facts that both would rather cover up, the judge can inquire into such 
matters. 
If the judge believes that additional information is needed to make 
an informed decision in a given case, the judge should have the au-
pose that the judge have authority to order counseling at any time either party petitions for 
divorce. 
150. See Note, Lawyering for the Child Principles of Representation in Custody and Visita-
tion Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE LJ. 1126, at 1127 n.7 (1978) (citing sources) 
[hereinafter cited as Lawyering for the Child], 
151. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
65-66(1973). 
152. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD& A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 114 
(1979). 
153. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 150, at 1138-42. That note found that in prac-
tice, counsel for children generally serves also as mediator between the parents, a role which is 
ignored by the proposed theoretical models. Mediation of such disputes is discussed infra 
beginning at text accompanying note 185. In that discussion, we advocate that mediation of 
child custody disputes be required. If no formal mediation structure is established, counsel for 
the child is justified in many cases for the purpose of mediating the dispute. 
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thority to appoint others to assist him or her in fact finding, but addi-
tional fact finding will generally require someone with skills other 
than those of a lawyer. The situation might justify the appointment of 
a psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate ihe child or the parents, or it 
might justify the appointment of a social worker to do a home study. 
If the judge feels that an interview with the child in the child's home or 
elsewhere by someone is justified, the judge should have the authority 
to appoint a social worker or one of the court personnel for that pur-
pose. Most of the areas in which it may be helpful for a judge to have 
aid in fact investigation are not areas iij which lawyers are trained, 
and courts should spend resources on those factfinders who have 
skills that can better assist the judge in tnaking the decision. 
Appearance of an attorney in the role 0f the child's advocate should 
also be unnecessary in a litigated custody case, where it is the respon-
sibility of the judge to protect the interests of the child. As Judge Car-
dozo stated: 
[The judge in a child custody case] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for 
the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affec-
tionate and careful parent," and make provision for the child accordingly. 
Finlay v. Finlayy 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925) (citation 
omitted). 
The primary goal of child custody casts is to determine what pro-
motes the best interests of the child. The issue which should be fore-
most in the judge's mind and which counsel for the parents should 
address is what best serves the child's interests. 
If an attorney serves as advocate for the child, that attorney will 
develop an opinion on the ultimate issue, i.e., what is in the best inter-
ests of the child, and then advocate that opinion. Counsel serves 
merely as an advisor to the judge as to the issue the judge must decide. 
In some cases, where the decision turns on complicated psychological 
questions, the judge should have the authority to appoint an expert, 
such as a child psychologist or psychiatrist, to give advice. The ap-
pointment of a lawyer, who, perhaps like the judge, generally has lim-
ited skills in psychology, is unjustified in such a case.154 
154. We will argue infra at note 182 that counsel for the child would be helpful in uncon-
tested cases immediately upon the separation of the parents, but that the expense of such a pro-
posal is prohibitive. We advocate the appointment of counsel for the child under the limited 
circumstances described infra at text accompanying note 184. 
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C. Protecting the Child's Interest in Substantial 
Contact with Both Parents 
As we have seen, when parents separate, a child suffers substantial 
short- and long-term losses as a result of the loss of contact with the 
absent parent. We have cited the finding of Wallerstein and Kelly 
that children have a strong desire for more time with the noncustodial 
parent, even when they have substantially more visitation than is gen-
erally ordered.155 On the other hand, the Wallerstein and Kelly study 
found that visitation is often the occasion for parental conflict,156 
which the Hetherington study157 and the Jacobson study158 found to 
be so destructive to children. 
Comparing the evidence of the negative impact of visitation with 
the evidence of its positive impact, we conclude that substantial con-
tact with both parents should be encouraged in three ways. First, 
there should be joint custody, under which parents share time with 
the children and responsibilities for them, where the parents request 
it. Second, where the parties cannot agree on joint custody, the courts 
should order substantial amounts of visitation with the noncustodial 
parent. Third, children should be entitled to established minimum 
amounts of child visitation and child support159 when their parents 
separate, and parents should not be permitted to agree to less than 
these minimum amounts, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit take the position that a child should 
be placed in and remain in the custody of one parent, who should 
have control over all aspects of the child's life, including the extent of 
the visitation, if any, which the child has with the noncustodial 
parent. 16° This position is justified on grounds that the visitations will 
serve as the source of discontinuity; loyalty conflicts will develop as a 
result of the visitation; the visited parent will have "little opportunity 
to serve as a true object for love, trust, and identification"; and the 
J 55 See text supra accompanying notes 54 to 57 
156 One-third of the children in the Wallerstein and Kelly study were consistently exposed 
to intense anger at visiting time See WALLERSTEIN, supra rote 1, at 125 
157. See supra note 95 and accompanying text 
158 See supra note 102 and accompanying text 
159 Though the establishment of minimum amounts of child support will help the child's 
financial security, our primary reason for supporting this, as argued infra at text follow mg note 
183, is that the payment of support has a positive effect on the exercise of visitation 
160 See J GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A SOLNIT, supra note 151, at 38 
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ongoing relationship between the custodial parent and the child will 
be endangered.161 
The Wallerstein and Kelly studkr provides substantial evidence 
contradicting the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit position that a noncus-
todial parent will have difficulty in sprving as an object for love, trust 
and identification for the child. Wallerstein and Kelly found that the 
children studied not only greatly desired substantial visitation, but 
that those children who did best undpr the deprivation of divorce were 
those whose visitation with the noncustodial parent was regular and 
dependable.162 
In addition to her study of the effects of parental conflict on chil-
dren after divorce,163 Doris Jacobson studied the effects of parental 
visitation on a child.164 She compared the results of the Louisville 
Behavior Checklist with those of th^ 'Time Spent Form" which she 
developed.16S The Time Spent Forrp measured the time spent by each 
parent in the presence of the child c|uring a two-week period prior to 
separation and during a two-weel^  period following separation.166 
The custodial parent was the mother and the visiting parent was the 
father in all but one of the thirty Jacobson families.167 The parents 
shared joint custody in that family.168 The Jacobson study found that 
the greater the loss of time with the father, the higher the maladjust-
ment of the child.169 No significant association was found between the 
child's adjustment and time lost with the mother.170 
On the basis of the findings of th^ Wallerstein and Kelly study and 
the Jacobson study, we believe the law should seek to protect the 
child's interest in maintaining a close relationship with both parents. 
The law should do this by (1) awarding joint custody where the 
161. Id. 
162. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 215. 
163. See Jacobson, supra note 102. 
164. See Jacobson, The Impact of Marital Separation/Divorce on Children: I. Parent-Child 
Separation and Child Adjustment, 1 J. DIVORC£341 (1978). 
165. See id at 348-49. [ 
166. See id. at 348. The study found that during the two-week period prior to separation, the 
mothers spent an average of 94.94 hours with the children and after separation an average of 
73.30 hours. The fathers spent an average of 53.6 hours with the children during the two-week 
period prior to separation and an average of 20.12 hours with them after separation. See id. at 
351. 
167. See id. at 347,350. 
168. See id. at 350. 
169. See id. at 356. 
170. See id. 
354 Family Law Quarterly, Volume XVII, Number 3, Fall 1983 
parents request it,171 (2) ordering substantial amounts of visitation in 
contested cases, and (3) establishing minimum amounts of child visi-
tation and child support when parents separate and there is no court 
order. 
A parent will take more interest in a child if he or she not only has 
substantial time with the child, but also has decision-making respon-
sibility about major aspects of the child's life, as is generally the case 
where parents share joint custody. Wallerstein and Kelly found that 
without such responsibility, "many noncustodial parents withdraw 
from their children in grief and frustration."172 
These authors take the position that the least detrimental situation 
for children of separated parents is one in which the parents can work 
together in a joint custody arrangement under which they share legal 
responsibilities for the children.173 Such an arrangement generally 
will not result in the parents having equal time with the children. 
Typically under joint custody arrangements, parents agree that the 
children will live with the mother on a day-to-day basis, but that the 
father will have more time with the children than under traditional 
custody orders.174 
Joint custody arrangements are not always, however, in the best in-
terests of the children. Judith Wallerstein reports a situation in which 
the parents agreed that the child would spend alternate years with 
each parent.175 Courts should carefully review unusual arrangements 
like this and should disapprove them if they are not in the best inter-
ests of the children. As more is learned about the effects of various 
joint custody arrangements on the lives of children, the law should 
create presumptions in favor of joint custody arrangements that have 
positive effects on children and should require careful judicial scru-
171. California in 1980 passed legislation that creates a statutory presumption that joint 
custody is in the best interests of the children when boi h parents are able to agree to it. See C AL. 
CIV. CODE § 4600 (Supp. 1982). As will be noted infra at text beginning at text accompanying 
note 203, we advocate mediation of custody visitation disputes, because parents that mediate 
such disputes agree to joint custody much more often than those who reach agreement within 
the traditional adversary system 
172. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 310. 
173. Seeid. at310-11. 
174. See Pearson and Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Strengths and Weaknesses Over 
Time, ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION SI, 61 (H. Davidson, L. Ray, 
and R. Horowitz eds. 1982) (hereinafter cited as Pearson). 
175. Address by Judith S. Wallerstein, Developing Mediation Models for Divorcing Fami-
lies with Children to Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Conference, San Fran-
cisco, California, May 19-22,1982, citing Reno Evening Gazette, February 24,1982. 
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tiny of other arrangements. Wheri parents are unable to agree on 
joint legal custody, custody should be given to one parent.176 To im-
pose joint custody where parents are unable to agree would generally 
give rise to substantial conflict that would be detrimental to the chil-
dren. 
When custody is granted to onri parent, courts should generally 
order more visitation with the noncustodial parent than is presently 
being ordered.177 Such visitation Should include not only weekend 
time but time during the week. An| increase in the amount of visita-
tion ordered by courts in litigated c^ses will lead to more visitation in 
cases which are not litigated, because court decisions are the basis for 
nonlitigated parental decisions in cases that are not litigated.178 
Parents look to their lawyers, who look to the courts for guidance.179 
In addition to approving joint legal custody when parents agree, 
and awarding substantial visitation rights to noncustodial parents 
who seek it, the law should provide specific rights of visitation to the 
noncustodial parent, and should gije specific rights of child support 
to the custodial parent, in the absence of a court order regulating 
those matters. Such provisions would provide relief during negotia-
tion and litigation of those issues, $nd would also protect the chil-
dren's interests in other situations where parentr ire separated and 
there is no visitation or support order. 
The custodial parent often has such a resentment toward *he other 
parent that he or she wants to prevent the child's contact with that 
parent. The custodial parent may honestly feel that it is in the child's 
best interests to keep the child from the influences of the former part-
ner. Also, as noted previously, Wallerstein and Kelly found that two-
thirds of the mothers and four-fifths of the fathers in their study were 
put under stress by visits.180 
It is, of course, in the financial interest of the noncustodial parent 
to avoid the payment of child support. Moreover, the noncustodial 
parent often resents giving money to the custodial parent for any 
176. As we argue infra at note 161, a presumptibn should be established that :? ts in the bc%< 
interests of the child that his custody be given to tpe primary caretaker. 
177. Wallerstein and Kelly found that when visitation was set by the courts, it was generally 
set at twice monthly overnight or weekend visits. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1 at 133. 
178. See Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). . 
179. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1 at 132-33 
180. See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 1 at 125; see also text supra accompanying note 25. 
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reason, and may feel that the custodial parent does not spend support 
money for the things that best benefit the child. 
When the custodial parent opposes the noncustodial parent's visi-
tation with the child, the custodial parent will often sacrifice child 
support in return for the noncustodial parent's having either no visi-
tation or limited visitation.m This arrangement may find expression 
in a formal separation agreement between the parties, or it may arise 
informally when the custodial parent fails to seek child support for 
fear the noncustodial parent will then seek visitation. In such a situa-
tion, the custodial parent is happy with limited or nonexistent visita-
tion, and the noncustodial parent is happy with limited or nonexistent 
child support. However, the child is hurt in both respects. The child 
has less financial security and is deprived of visitation with the non-
custodial parent.182 
We propose that where one parent serves as the primary, day-to-
181. In other situations, the custodial parent may be subject to unfair pressures to accept no 
child support or unreasonably low child support to the detriment of the child. Generally it is the 
parent who has spent the most time caring for the child who has developed the closest emotional 
bond with the child and most wants custody. This parent is subject to threats from the other 
parent, whether real or feigned, that he or she will seek custody if the primary caretaker seeks 
child support. The primary caretaker is in a weak bargaining position because he or she will 
give in on many issues to insure that he or she will retain custody. The stronger the primary 
caretaker's emotional bond to the child, the weaker the bargaining position. The custodial 
parent may fail to pursue child support for fear the other parent will seek custody. 
In a most interesting article which points out the effects of the rules of law concerning divorce 
on the negotiation of separation agreements, Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser point 
out that the switch in most states from having a preference for the mother as custodian to plac-
ing the parents on an equal footing has placed the mother, who generally becomes the custo-
dian, in a weaker bargaining position vis-a-vis the other issues arising when parents separate. 
See Mnookin and Kornhauser, supra note 178, at 177-78. In light of this finding and of 
Bowlby's findings concerning the importance of the child's maintaining a regular relationship 
with his primary attachment figure, there should be a presumption that a child's custody be 
placed with his primary caretaker. See ATTACHMENT, supra note 70, at 304-6. See also supra 
notes 69 to94 and accompanying text. It will not be easy in all cases to determine which parent 
is the primary caretaker but such a presumption wou Id properly establish the question of who is 
the child's primary caretaker as the most important factor in a custody determination. 
182. Those who advocate that counsel be appointed for the child in custody proceedings 
have generally advocated that counsel be appointed in disputed cases when one of the parents 
initiates a custody proceeding. Appointment of counsel for the child at that stage would not 
prevent the sort of problem here described. As noted earlier, generally the interests of the child 
are adequately protected by the judge and counsel for the parties where custody matters are 
litigated. See text supra following text accompanying note 117. Note, A Child's Due Process 
Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 948 (1976), argues 
that counsel for the child should be provided for undisputed cases. That note does not desig-
nate a time at which such counsel should be appointed. 
The point at which children most need protection of their interests is when the parents 
separate and do not contest custody or related matters. It would be ideal to have an attorney ap-
pointed to represent the interests of the child immediately upon the separation of the parties. 
The attorney could make sure that visitation and child support are at the appropriate level. If 
visitation is not being exercised by the noncustodial parent at an appropriate level because of 
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day caretaker of a child, minimum standards of child visitation and 
child support be established by law, to go into effect immediately 
upon the separation of the parents. For either parent to fail to abide 
by at least the minimum standards of support and visitation, without 
court approval, would be a violation of the law. 
A proper minimum standard for child visitation would be an aver-
age of one day per week for children ovef one year of age. The law 
should establish guidelines as to timing 6f visits, which the parties 
could vary by agreement. For example, tlfie law could establish that 
unless the parents agree otherwise, on alternate weekends the non-
custodial parent would pick up the childre i^ irom the home of the cus-
todial parent at 6:00 P.M. on Friday and return them at 6:00 P.M. on 
Sunday. If either party felt that the circumstances justified other 
visitation arrangements, and was unable o^ negotiate other arrange-
ments, he or she could take the matter to ctwrt. Pending a court deci-
sion, the child and the noncustodial parent would be entitled to visi-
tation under the schedule established by statute. 
The law should also establish minimum standards of child sup-
port, based on the number of children and the after-tax income of the 
noncustodial parent. An amount of child support lower than the min-
imum standards would require court approval. An example of the 
type of minimum standards which should be established are those 
under the schedule of child support payments that goes into effect 
under court order pending litigation in Seattle, Washington. That 
schedule is based on cost-of-living information from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The established percentages of the noncustodial 
parent's after-tax income (assuming the standard deduction) are 24 
percent for one child, 35 percent for two children, 42 percent for three 
children and 48 percent for four children,183 
A minimum standard schedule of child support would not estab-
lish the appropriate long-term amount of support in all cases. It 
would establish the minimum support required when the parties 
separate and it would not affect the factor^ a judge would consider if 
the emotional difficulties that the noncustodial parent feels at visitation, counsel could coax 
the noncustodial spouse to exercise such visitation, pointing out the child's need for such visita-
tion. However, the costs of counsel in all such situations would make such a provision un-
feasible. 
183. New Child Support Schedule, Seattle-King County Association Bar Bulletin (Decem-
ber 1974). 
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the matter of child support were taken before him or her. Of course, 
what the judge would order is the primary question the parties would 
consider when reaching settlement on the issue of child support. If 
factors should warrant a variation from the schedule's minimum 
amount, e.g., a great disparity in the parent's property or a much 
greater earning capacity of the noncustodial spouse than his or her 
earnings reflect, those factors would play the same role in reaching a 
child support figure that they now play. The only difference would be 
that court approval would be required for an amount lower than the 
minimum standard and at least the minimum would be required 
pending any court hearing. 
Not only would the minimum support requirement aid the finan-
cial situation of the child, in many situations it would also avoid prob-
lems with visitation. If a parent knew that the failure to make the ap-
propriate child support payment were a violation of law that would 
have consequences later, he would be less likely to fail to make such 
payments than if his only fear were that the custodial parent would 
withhold visitation. Likewise, because of the noncustodial parent's 
continual payment of support, the custodial parent would be less 
likely to deny visitation. 
Minimum standards of visitation and support should be enforced 
through several means. First, if the noncustodial parent failed to pay 
the established child support, an arrearage should accrue, which 
could be enforced like any debt. Second, if either party were found 
unreasonably to have caused the violation of the minimum standard, 
he or she should be required to pay the resulting attorney's fees of the 
other party. Finally, the law should require that the divorce petition 
and responsive pleading contain sworn statements by each of the 
parents showing (1) the amount of visitation the noncustodial parent 
has exercised since the separation, (2) the income of the noncustodial 
parent, and (3) the amount of child support that has been paid or 
received. If the noncustodial parent has not paid the minimum child 
support payment, future payments and payments on the arrearage 
should be paid through the court. If the minimum child visitation has 
not been exercised in an uncontested case, we propose that an at-
torney or some other responsible person be appointed to investigate 
the situation, to review the terms of any separation agreement, and to 
represent the child's interests concerning that agreement. If counsel 
for the child agrees that less visitation than the minimum standard is 
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in the best interests of the child, 
court approval of more limited 
should require that the parents 
ne or she could join in a motion for 
visitation. In such a situation, the law 
pky the appointed attorney's fee.184 
D. Mediation of Domestic Disputes 
Much has been written in recent yfears about the mediation of domes-
tic disputes.185 We will examine evidence ef the effect of mediation on 
conflict between parents, and of the kinds of custody agreements that 
are generally reached by mediating couples. We will conclude that 
couples should be required to attempt to mediate custody and visita-
tion disputes prior to litigation. 18r 
Under mediation, the parties ipeet with a third party, the media-
tor, who: 
encourages the disputants to find a mutually agreeable settlement by helping 
them to identify the issues, reduce misunderstandings, vent emotions, clarify 
priorities, find points of agreement, explore new areas of compromise, and 
ultimately negotiate an agreement l87 
The most extensive empirical si 
traditional adversary system in 
tudy comparing mediation with the 
(fustody disputes is that of Jessica 
184 This is the one situation in which we drbw an exception to our general rule that appoint-
ment of counsel for the child is not justified As noted supra at text accompanying notes 153 to 
154, we believe that generally the judge and counsel for the respective parents represent ade-
quately the child s interests in contested cases As noted in supra at note 140, a child is more 
likely to need counsel where parents separate and do not contest custody or visitation Where 
such matters are not contested, the child is more likely to be deprived of visitation and support 
Although appointing counsel in all uncontested cases would not be practical because of the ex 
pense, where visitation has not been exercised at the minimum level the parents have indicated 
their lack of concern for this need of the child, and the oversight of an attorney is justified 
185 See e g ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION supra note 174 and 
sources cited therein at 609-12 
186 Mediation of such matters was mandkted by California in 1980, see CAL CIV CODE 
§4607(West 1982) and Florida in 1982 W F I [ A S B 419 (Effective July 1,1982) UnderCali-
fornia law when a pleading indicates that cuktody or visitation is at issue, whether b> initial 
petition or petition for modification, the disputed issue is set for mediation with court person 
nel See CAL CIV CODE § 4607(a) (West 1982) The California Code States 
The purpose of such mediation proceeding shall be to reduce acnmom « ch mav exist be-
tween the parties and to develop an agreement assuring the child or children s close and con-
tinuing contact with both parents after the jnarnage is dissolved Id 
The mediation proceedings are confidential See id § 4607(c) The mediator may exclude 
counsel from the sessions and may interview thi child or children See id § 4607(d) Provisions 
made for payment of the expenses required by such mediation by raising divorce filing fees and 
the fees for mamage licenses and certificates CAL GOV CODE §26840 3 (West 1982) If the 
parties are unable to reach an agreement of the disputed issues in mediation, the matter is 
handled under the regular adversary procedures 
187 Pearson, supra note 173, at 53 
360 Family Law Quarterly, Volume XVII, Number 3, Fall 1983 
Pearson and Nancy Thoennes.188 Under that study, divorcing cou-
ples were randomly assigned to mediation and control groups. Each 
of the members of the control group proceeded through the regular 
adversary procedure, while those in the mediation group were offered 
cost-free mediation services.189 Half of the couples who were offered 
mediation services rejected them.190 Interviews with the members of 
the control group were held (1) when a pleading initiating a custody or 
visitation dispute was filed, (2) soon after the court promulgated a 
final order, and (3) six to twelve months after the final order.191 
Couples who accepted mediation were assigned to trained male-
female mediation teams of lawyers and mental health professionals, 
and were interviewed (1) before mediation, (2) immediately after 
mediation, (3) soon after the court promulgated a final order, and (4) 
six to twelve months after the final order.192 
Fifty-eight percent of the couples who attempted mediation were 
able to reach agreement on the issues of custody and visitation during 
mediation, and of those who failed during mediation, 65 percent were 
able to reach agreement before they went to court.193 Thus, a total of 
80 percent of the couples accepting mediation produced their own 
custody and visitation agreement, either during or after mediation.194 
By contrast, only half of those in the control group and half of those in 
the group that chose not to accept mediation reached an agree-
ment.195 
At six to twelve months after the divorce, of those individuals who 
had successfully reached an agreement during mediation, a much 
smaller percentage had filed a motion to modify the court decree than 
the percentage in all other groups, and a substantially greater per-
centage reported their spouses in compliance with the court decree 
188 See id at 55-57 
189 See id at 56 
190 See id 
191 See id 
192 See id The Pearson and Thoennes article presents a short-term comparison of 125 
mediation clients, 63 individuals in the adversarial control group and 95 individuals *ho re 
jected mediation, and a six- to twelve month term comparison of 92 mediation clients, 50 con 
trol individuals, 74 individuals who rejected mediation See id at 57 
193 See id at 57-58 
194 See id at 58 
195 See id at 58, 72 The average time between the initiation of proceedings and the pro 
mulgation of final orders v. as less for the successful mediation group (8 5 months) than the con 
trol group (10 2 months), or the group that rejected mediation (10 9 months) but the group 
mo\ed the slowest *as the unsuccessful mediation group (14 2 months) See id at 61 
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than in the other groups.196 The percentage of each group that re-
ported filing motions to modify were:197 
Successful mediation group 9 
Unsuccessful mediation group 22 
Control group J 20 
Group that rejected mediation 20 
The percentage who reported thai their spouse was in compliance 
were:198 
Successful mediation group 59 
Unsuccessful mediation grout) 30 
Control group ^ 30 
Group that rejected mediatio i^ 37 
The couples who were exposed to mediation chose some form of 
joint custody substantially more often than those in other groups. 
The percentage of those couples within each group agreeing to joint 
custody were:199 
Successful mediation group ^ 69 
Unsuccessful mediation group 14 
Control group J 7 
Group that rejected mediation 6 
On the average, children whose parents were exposed to mediation 
saw the parent with whom they did not live on a day-to-day basis more 
often than did other children. Soon after the court decree, the 
average number of days per montfy with such parent for each group 
was as follows:200 
Successful mediation group 7.7 
Unsuccessful mediation group 5.5 
Control Group 4.9 
Group that rejected mediation 4.9 
At six to twelve months following the court decree, the average num-
ber of days per month were:201 
1%. See id. at 59. 
197. See id. at 73. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. at 72. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. at 73. 
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Successful mediation group 9.0 
Unsuccessful mediation group 7.1 
Control group 5.1 
Group that rejected mediation 5.4 
Children, therefore, generally benefit in several respects from the 
mediation of domestic disputes. First, and most importantly, media-
tion often reduces the amount of parental conflict to which the children 
are exposed. Mediation can provide a forum for parental conflict away 
from the children and, as the Pearson and Thoennes study indicates, 
under mediation parents are more likely to reach an agreement, they 
are more committed to the success of the resulting agreement, and less 
conflict arises from the agreement than under agreements reached and 
orders made under the traditional adversary process.202 
Second, mediation benefits children because those parents who 
participate in mediation are more likely to decide to share joint cus-
tody and allow more visitation.203 As noted previously,204 we believe 
that joint custody generally is in the interest of children. 
Third, when parents are able to negotiate a settlement through 
mediation, parental autonomy and privacy are preserved. It is impor-
tant to the development of a child that he maintain a belief in the sub-
stantial knowledge and the strength of his parents. This belief is 
weakened when he knows or senses that the decisions concerning his 
future are out of the hands of his parents, and in the hands of attor-
neys and judges. A child will have a greater respect for his parents if 
he knows they have made the decisions concerning him.205 
Finally, mediation is superior to litigation or negotiation by attor-
neys because parents know their children best and therefore are gen-
erally better able than a judge or the attorneys to reach an agreement 
tailored to the children's specific needs.206 
202 See supra notes 193 to 198 and accompan)mg text 
203 See supra notes 199 to 201 and accompanying text 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 171 to 17* 
205 In this regard, see J GOLDSTEIN, A FRELD &. A SOLNIT, supra note 152 at 7-11 
206 Of course, parents ma> reach agreements w hich * ill be to the parents' mutual advan 
tage and to the disadvantage of the children For this rea son, we believe that the previously 
proposed minimum standard requirements of visitation and support should apply to mediated 
agreements as well as to other agreements and that an> variation should require court ap 
proval See supra text accompanying notes 180 to 184 
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